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III. 
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§34A-2-801(8)(d) and Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2. 
IV. 
INTRODUCTION 
This matter is a Petition for Review of decision by an Administrative Law Judge 
on March 18, 2004 and Order Denying Motion for Review issued September 8, 2004 by 
the Labor Commission. The Applicant was injured within the course and scope of his 
employment with the Department of Public Safety on three occasions, December 17, 
1990, June 10, 1994 and May 14, 1998. Applicant requests benefits pursuant to the Utah 
Workers Compensation Act, Utah Code Ann. §35A-1-1 et. seq. The Labor Commission 
awarded benefits, the amount of which are not determined, but denied permanent total 
disability benefits claiming that pain was not related to any of the industrial accidents. 
The Labor Commission improperly determined that the pain was the significant cause of 
the Applicant's disability. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES and STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Whether Mr. Braegger is Permanently and Totally disabled. This issue is a 
question of law. The Court of Appeals reviews the Labor Commission's decision 
under a correction of law standard. Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-16(4)(d). 
2. Whether the Chronic Pain Syndrome is related to the Industrial Accident. This 
issue is a mixed question of law and fact. The Court of Appeals will not disturb 
the findings or order of the Commission if they are supported by the 
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"preponderance of evidence". However, the Court of Appeals also recognizes the 
duty, particularly with reference to a denial of compensation, to determine 
whether the Commission had arbitrarily disregarded competent evidence in favor 
of unsubstantial contradictory evidence. See Nicholson v. Industrial Commission, 
389 P.2d 730 (Utah 1964), Ashcroft v. Industrial Commission, 855 P.2d 267 
(UtahCt.App. 1993). 
3. Whether the impairment determined by Dr. Chung on the Chronic Pain Syndrome 
is appropriate by law. This is a mixed question of fact and law. The Court of 
Appeals will not disturb the findings or order of the Commission if they are 
supported by the "preponderance of evidence". However, the Court of Appeals 
also recognizes the duty, particularly with reference to a denial of compensation, 
to determine whether the Commission had arbitrarily disregarded competent 
evidence in favor of unsubstantial contradictory evidence. The Court of Appeals 
will not disturb the findings or order of the Commission if they are supported by 
the "prepond' ranee of evidence". However, the Court of Appeals also recognizes 
the duty, particularly with reference to a denial of compensation, to determine 
whether the Commission had arbitrarily disregarded competent evidence in favor 
of unsubstantial contradictory evidence. See Nicholson v. Industrial Commission, 
389 P.2d 730 (Utah 1964), Ashcroft v. Industrial Commission, 855 P.2d 267 
(UtahCt.App. 1993). 
4. Whether the Chronic Pain Syndrome is related to the industrial accident. This 
issue is a mixed question of law and fact. The Court of Appeals will not disturb 
the findings or order of the Commission if they are supported by the 
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"preponderance of evidence". However, the Court of Appeals also recognizes the 
duty, particularly with reference to a denial of compensation, to determine 
whether the Commission had arbitrarily disregarded competent evidence in favor 
of unsubstantial contradictory evidence. See Nicholson v. Industrial Commission, 
389 P.2d 730 (Utah 1964), Ashcroft v. Industrial Commission, 855 P.2d 267 
(UtahCt.App. 1993). 
5. Whether the Labor Commission is mandated to send this matter to a medical 
panel. The Court of Appeals reviews the Labor Commission's decision under a 
correction of law standard. Utah Code Ann. §63-46b- 16(4)(d). . See Nicholson 
v. Industrial Commission, 389 P.2d 730 (Utah 1964), Ashcroft v. Industrial 
Commission, 855 P.2d 267 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
6. Whether "pain" should be considered a significant cause of permanent total 
disability benefits. This issue is a mixed question of law and fact. The Court of 
Appeals will not disturb the findings or order of the Commission if they are 
supported by ^he "preponderance of evidence". However, the Court of Appeals 
also recognizes the duty, particularly with reference to a denial of compensation, 
to determine whether the Commission had arbitrarily disregarded competent 
evidence in favor of unsubstantial contradictory evidence. See Nicholson v. 
Industrial Commission, 389 P.2d 730 (Utah 1964), Ashcroft v. Industrial 
Commission, 855 P.2d 267 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
7. Whether the Labor Commission should be mandated to issue an award. This is an 
issue of law. The Court of Appeals reviews the Labor Commission's decision 
under a correction of law standard. Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-16(4)(d). 
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8. Whether Odd Lot is still appropriate. This is an issue of law. The Court of 
Appeals reviews the Labor Commission's decision under a correction of law 
standard. Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-16(4)(d). 
VI. 
STATEMENT AND NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a Petition for Review of the Utah Labor Commission determination of 
benefits and whether the Utah Labor Commission followed it's own rules, directives and 
statutes in making it's decision. Appellant John Brent Braegger seeks this matter be 
remanded back for further determination and issuance of an award and to have the matter 
referred to a medical panel pursuant to Utah Labor Commission rules. 
VII. 
COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
John Brent Braegger filed three applications for hearing on April 24, 2002 for 
injuries suffered on December, 17, 1990 (Case no. 2002948), June 10, 1994 (Case No. 
2002497) and May 14, 1998 (Case no. 2002948). A hearing was held on August 28, 
2003. Judge Deidre Marlowe issued her Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law on March 
18, 2004. A Motion for Review was timely filed with the Labor Commission. On 
September 8, 2004, the Commissioner for the Utah Labor Commission, R. Lee Ellertson, 
denied the Motion for Review. A Petition for Review was timely filed on September 27, 
2004. 
VIII. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
1. John Brent Braegger worked for the Utah Department of Public Safety, Criminal 
Investigations Bureau as a Police Officer. 
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2. As a Police Officer, he was injured 3 significant times while in the course and 
scope of his employment. These include: 
a. December 18, 1990, he was moving a file cabinet to retrieve an item, he 
felt a sharp pain in his lower back. He continued to experience pain, 
numbness and tingling in his left leg going down the front and side of his 
leg. While he did improve, the numbness and tingling never v/ent 
completely away. See Findings of Fact, paragraph 2. 
b. June 10, 1994, while moving offices from one floor to another, he felt 
sharp pain again in his low back, with increased numbness and tingling to 
his left leg. The low back pain increased. See Findings of Fact, paragraph 
3. 
c. May 14, 1998, Mr. Braegger was descending a complete flight of stairs at 
the Public Safety Building. He overstepped the first step and fell head 
over heels down 13 metal, carpeted stairs. He struck his left cheek, low 
back, upper neck, left shoulder and left hip. The pain intensified 
dramatically in his low back. He felt sharp pain described as a "sharp 
shock" into his left arm and fingers. See Findings of Fact, paragraph 4. 
d. Immediately after the 1998 injury, Mr. Braegger experienced pain, loss of 
strength and stamina to walk. He experienced difficulty getting in and out 
of chairs and vehicles; going up and down stairs became very difficult; 
and he would grind his teeth because of the intense pain. He continued to 
have pain and weakness in the neck, shoulder and low back areas radiating 
into his arms and legs. See Findings of Fact, paragraph 6. 
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e. Mr. Braegger continued to work in pain until March 15, 2001 when it was 
determined he could no longer perform his essential duties as a Police 
Officer. 
f. Mr. Braegger has suffered no additional injuries since the 1998 accident. 
g. Workers Compensation Fund of Utah has admitted that all accidents were 
within the course and scope of employment. 
h. Workers Compensation Fund of Utah further admits to medical causation 
of the significant injuries relating to the neck, shoulder, cheek, low back 
and hip. See pages 7, 8, 11, 12 and 52 of hearing transcript (contained in 
the addendum) 
i. Mr. Braegger has a pre-existing type II diabetes condition (non insulin 
dependent). However, his diabetes did not prevent him from working, nor 
does it now. 
j . While Mr. Braegger did have pain from the other industrial injuries, it was 
not as significant as the pain and weakness immediately following the 
5/14/1998 accident, 
k. All the parties agree that Mr. Braegger is functionally unable to work. 
1. All of the parties agree that while Applicant did suffer from pain and 
weakness prior to May 14, 1998 solely as a result of the prior industrial 
accidents, it intensified considerably and immediately following the May 
14, 1998 event. 
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3. Workers Compensation Fund of Utah denies, however, the medical relationship 
between the pain relating to the Applicant's peripheral neuropathy and the 
industrial accidents. 
IX. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Mr. Braegger is permanently and totally disabled from the industrial accidents he 
suffered while in the course and scope of his employment. He suffered injuries, pain and 
weakness which is undisputed. The Workers Compensation Fund admits the industrial 
accidents, but disputes whether the pain is related to any of the industrial accidents and 
that it is the pain that is the sole disabling condition. Mr. Braegger maintains that the 
pain is part and process of the Industrial Accidents. Nevertheless, even if the Chronic 
Pain Syndrome is not related to the Industrial Accident, the Applicant would still be 
considered Permanently and Totally disabled. The Labor Commission should have 
referred this matter to a medical panel as there are significant medical issues and pursuant 
to their own rules, a nedical panel referral is mandated. Finally, the Labor Commission 
failed to issue and determine an award for benefits on Mr. Braegger's industrial accidents 
leaving the determination up to the Respondents to "figure it out". 
X. 
ARGUMENT 
Mr. Braegger is Permanently and Totally Disabled. 
It has been stipulated that Mr. Braegger was injured within the course and scope of 
his employment with the Department of Public Safety on three occasions. Further, there 
has been no evidence presented that Mr. Braegger was injured prior or subsequent to the 
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industrial accidents. Mr. Braegger has been unable to work since March 15, 2001 since it 
was determined by his employer that he could not return and perform his previous work 
activities. Mr. Braegger has been determined disabled according to the Social Security 
Sequential Decision making process. Immediately following the industrial injuries, Mr. 
Braegger suffered pain and weakness. While some of the pain relating to the neck, 
shoulder, low back, cheek, and hip is directly related to the industrial accident, there is a 
dispute about whether his chronic pain syndrome is related. The law is clear that an 
aggravation or "lighted up" of the chronic pain "give rise to" and leads to the direct cause 
of the disability. Giesbrecht v. Board of Review, 828 P.2d 544 (1992), Allen v. Industrial 
Commission, 729 P.2d 14, 25 (Utah 1986). Judge Marlowe determined that the chronic 
pain were more debilitating than the injury to the neck, shoulder, cheek, low back hip and 
related pain. Nevertheless, the question is not which is more debilitating, but rather could 
the Applicant return to previous work as a result of the industrial injuries. See Utah 
Code Ann. §34A-2-413)l)(b)(iii). This was never analyzed, and according to the 
functional capacity report, (see attached) and Department of Public Safety, Mr. Braegger 
would not be able to return because of his industrial injuries. 
The Chronic Pain Syndrome is related to the Industrial Accident 
The Applicant did not have any substantial pain or weakness prior to the 
industrial accidents and more specifically, the accident of 5/14/1998. Immediately 
following the accident, Applicant suffered pain and weakness. There was no intervening 
event that would cause the pain. All of the physicians note the proximity of the 
5/14/1998 event and the location of the pain relative to the injuries suffered by the 
Applicant. Nevertheless, the peripheral neuropathy was puzzling. 
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The Applicant was treated by Dr. Stansfield for pain and weakness in the low 
back area as well as the neck. On September 7, 1999, Dr. Stansfield conducted 
Electromyographic testing to ascertain the cause of the pain. Specifically, Dr. Stansfield 
stated: 'The purpose of the EMG at this time is to determine if there is evidence of a 
peripheral neuropathy secondary to the diabetes or entrapment neuropathy secondary to 
the fall that he experienced". Dr. Stansfield is an expert in diabetes. While Dr. Stansfield 
does not reveal his findings are related to the industrial accident, his report clearly 
indicates the peripheral neuropathy was not related to diabetes. Therefore, it is deduced 
to be related to the industrial accident as they were the only options determined by Dr. 
Stansfield. 
Workers Compensation Fund of Utah sent the Applicant to Dr. Jeffrey Chung on 
April 18, 2000. Dr. Chung is a physiatrist. A physiatrist is someone that deals in sports 
related injuries. Dr. Chung revealed that while Mr. Braegger was compliant with his 
therapy, the medical treatment for the industrial accident would increase the symptoms of 
pain and discomfort. See page 038 ME. Dr. Chung also related that Dr. Felix felt the 
pain in the Applicant's left hand were caused by a rotator cuff tear which would be part 
of the industrial accident. See page 038 ME. Mr. Braegger indicated he had pain in his 
neck, hips and upper extremity. Applicant manifested to Dr. Chung that he had the 
following symptoms (see page 39 ME): 
a. Constant pain since 5/15/1998 
b. Difficulty driving because of severe sharp pain. 
c. Turning neck to the left caused pain to the right side. 
d. Shooting pain in his neck on left side. 
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e. Headaches 
f. Low back Pain 
g. Pain in left hip 
h. Swelling of legs 
i. Feet and legs would sweat 
j . Leg cramps in back of calves and arch of feet 
k. Difficulty sleeping 
Dr. Chung finds medical causation between the chronic pain syndrome and the 
5/14/1998 accident. Dr. Chung determined on April 18, 2000 that Applicant had 
sustained an injury on 5/14/1998. He opined that Applicant's injuries "helped the 
patient's non-industrially related rheumatologic condition to become clinically 
significant." See page 047 ME. He further opined that the 5/14/1998 accident "has 
caused the patient to have chronic soft tissue injuries in the cervical and lumbosacral 
region. In addition, subsequent to the industrial injury of 5-14-98, Dr. Chung opined that 
the patient's previously clinically asymptomatic rheumatologic condition with features 
consistent with polymyositis became clinically evident." Dr. Chung opined "The patient 
in my opinion was teetering on the edge of a cliff without actually falling and it was 
likely that eventually the patient would have fallen anyway. Suffering from his industrial 
injury of 5-14-98 did not help his condition at all and possibly or even probably caused 
him to be pushed off the cliff, causing his previously clinically asymptomatic systemic 
rheumatologic condition to become symptomatic." (See page 049 ME). Dr. Chung 
continued to treat the Applicant indicating he had "Status post industrial injury of 5-14-
98 when the patient fell down stairs causing chronic symptoms in the cervico-thoracic 
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region and at the left hip region in addition to other findings consistent with a systemic 
connective tissue disorder with polymyositis-type features". See 026, 027, 030, 032 ME. 
On October 17, 2002, Applicant was sent again to Dr. Chung for determination of 
impairment. See page 009 ME. During that examination, Dr. Chung reversed his 
position by saying the Applicant did not have polymyositis or myositis. Dr. Chung 
further indicated that "If my assumptions of fact are incorrect, my conclusions based on 
these assumptions are also likely to be incorrect". He then indicated one of two 
possibilities on medical causation. His first theory is that Mr. Braegger's medical 
problem is "currently unknown to medical science". His next theory is that Mr. 
Braegger's pain is related to psychological problems such as conversion disorder and/or 
malingering. Dr. Chung dismissed the psychological problem immediately. Dr. Chung 
further indicated that the industrial injuries "precipitated or accelerated multiple 
symptoms related to multilevel degenerative changes at the cervical and lumbar spine. 
Dr. Chung then confuses the issues when he determined that applicant has diabetes 
related, four-extremity peripheral polyneuropathy and bilateral peroneal 
mononeuropathies. Note that he did not take into consideration that the industrial 
accident (legal causation) contributed to or aggravated an underlying asymptomatic pre-
existing condition. He was solely looking at the underlying cause. 
Dr. Stromquist opined several diagnoses relating to the pain condition: 
A. He has advanced degenerative disc disease in the cervical and lumbar spines 
(industrially related). 
B. He has a rotator cuff tear in the left shoulder (likewise industrially related). 
C. He has pain and restricted mobility in the left hip (likewise industrially related). 
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D. Dr. Stromquist finally determined and suggested that "The causation of chronic pain 
syndromes specifically is unknown, but it is held to relate to physical trauma in a 
susceptible individual, aggravated by certain adverse conditions, among which may 
be depression or psychological maladjustment, physical deconditioning and an 
adverse treatment environment (litigation or insurance claims are a factor). Dr. 
Stromquist indicated that the Degenerative Disc Disease was aggravated by the 
injury as was his left hip arthritis. His left lateral femoral cutaneous severe 
syndrome was caused or aggravated either by the fall, or by wearing the heavy 
equipment around the hips such as a gun or tool belt. 
Dr. Chris Chung, a Fellow with Jim Macintyre opined that Applicant had Neck 
pain, probable C-Spine and T-spine mechanical dysfunction. (See page 151 ME) 
All of the physicians note the proximity of the complaints in relation to the 
industrial accident of 5/14/1998. 
Utah law recognizes the aggravation rule such that where an industrial injury 
aggravates, accelerates, or combines with a pre-existing condition, the entire resulting 
injury is compensable so long as the claimant can "show that the employment contributed 
something substantial to increase the risk he already faced in everyday life because of his 
condition." Giesbrecht v. Board of Review, 828 P.2d 544(1992), Allen v. Industrial 
Commission, 729 P.2d 15, 25 (Utah 1986). 
The pain and weakness that Applicant receives should be considered related to the 
industrial accident. The symptoms surfaced immediately after the industrial accident of 
5/14/1998. It is in the location of his neck, shoulder, low back, cheek, hip and radiating 
toward his extremities. Since there is time, place, location of injury and absence of any 
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evidence to the contrary, it therefore should be considered as part of the industrial 
accident. If there is an underlying asymptomatic condition that becomes symptomatic as 
a result of the industrial injury, it is likewise compensable under the workers 
compensation system. Finally, "but for" the industrial accident, he would not be 
suffering these problems. He was not being treated for chronic pain, nor did he anticipate 
any treatment for the condition. Finally, even though he has continued pain in his neck, 
shoulder, low back and hip, which is directly and causally related to the industrial 
accident, it should not be assumed that all of his pain and weakness is related to other 
causes. In fact, the chronic pain syndrome that is in dispute is related only to his 
extremities. Judge Marlowe wholly misinterprets the records when she states there is 
"nothing in the medical records which relates this syndrome to the injury". As indicated 
above, there is ample evidence to show a connection with the pain and the industrial 
accident. 
The impairment determined by Dr. Chung on the Chronic Pain Syndrome was not 
appropriate. 
The Utah Labor Commission requires that an impairment must be determined 
according to the Utah's 2002 Impairment Guides as published by the Utah Labor 
Commission. If the condition is not found in the Utah 2002 Impairment Guides, then one 
is to utilize the AMA Guides for Evaluation of Permanent Impairment 5th Edition and as 
modified by the Utah Labor Commission guidelines. See Rule R612-7-3. 
The Utah's 2002 Impairment Guides do not address pain. However, in the AMA 
Guides for Evaluation of Permanent Impairment 5th Edition on page 566, it states: (See 
addendum) 
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Pain is subjective. Its presence cannot be readily validated or objectively 
measured. Physicians are confronted with ambiguity as they attempt to assess the 
severity and significance of chronic pain in their patients. In large part, this stems 
from the fundamental divide between a person who suffers from pain and an 
observer who attempts to understand that suffering. Observers tend to view pain 
complaints with suspicion and disbelief, akin to complaints of dizziness, fatigue 
and malaise. As Scarry remarked, "To have great pain is to have certainty, to hear 
that another person has pain is to have doubt". (See page 566) 
. . . . In the majority of cases there is no demonstrable tissue pathology. 
Thus, pain can exist without tissue damage, and tissue damage can exist without 
pain. In summary, there is no "pain thermometer," that is, no biological measure 
that correlates highly with individuals' complaints of pain. (See page 566.) 
. . . Because percentages for pain-related impairment have not been used 
and tested on a widespread basis, as have other impairment ratings used in the 
Guides , it was decided that impairment ratings for pain disorders would not be 
expressed as percentages of whole person impairment. (See page 566.) 
The AMA Guides for Evaluation of Permanent Impairment 5th Edition 
specifically addresses when there are "controversial Pain Syndromes. It specifically 
states: 
As noted above, physicians disagree sharply about whether individuals 
with chronic pain should be construed as having conditions with definite, albeit 
obscure, biologic underpinnings. The alternative is to describe these people as 
having CPS (Chronic Pain Syndrome), psychogenic pain syndromes, or some 
other term implying that their pain cannot be associated with a well-accepted 
biologic abnormality. For purposes of this chapter, the pain of individuals with 
ambiguous or controversial pain syndromes is considered unratable. (See page 
371) 
Dr. Chung went contrary to the AMA Guides for Evaluation of Permanent 
Impairment 5th Edition when he determined Mr. Braegger suffered an impairment rating 
for pain of 25%. Dr. Chung then further complicates matters by advocating for the 
Workers Compensation Fund that the pain impairment exceeds that of all other functional 
limitations without any basis. Dr. Chung admits in his report that the impairment rating 
is not accurate. In fact, it is misleading. The Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent 
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Impairment rarely allow an impairment relating to pain as it is often associated with 
various injuries or diseases. See page 570. "Physicians recognize the local and instant 
pain that commonly accompanies many disorders. Impairment ratings in the Guides 
already have accounted for pain." Dr. Chung's report should not be accepted by the 
Labor Commission as it clearly goes against it's rules of using the AMA Guides and 
secondly, Judge Marlowe should have sent the matter to a medical panel for clarification 
and determination of impairment according to rule. 
Judge Marlowe misapplies the direct cause of the permanent disability. She states 
that it is related to the Chronic Pain Syndrome. She infers that because the impairment 
rating for pain as indicated by Dr. Chung is higher than the injuries to the neck, low back, 
shoulder, cheek and left hip that the functional limitations are not the "direct cause". 
There is a significant difference between impairment and disability. Impairment is a loss 
of function, while disability is how the injuries affect one in their vocation. Further, the 
statute for Permanent Total Disability requires a "substantial" not a "sole direct cause" 
standard. See Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-413. 
Judge Marlowe ruled completely opposite to uncontroverted evidence 
Judge Marlowe further cites in her record that Mr. Braegger claims that without 
the pain, he would still be able to work. This goes contrary and is completely opposite to 
the evidence presented: 
Hearing Transcript, page 55, line 18 to page 56, line 7 
Q. Okay, do you believe that your current symptoms are related to the accident 
that was in May of 1998 and, if so, why? 
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A. I believe that they are, yes. The reason I believe that is I've had no problems 
or any type like symptoms prior to the accident. All my problems have started to come 
on and caused and notice since the accident. Prior to that, I was functioning fine, doing 
my job, going on just like normal. Other than I'd watch my lower back, I knew I had a 
problem there, so I was cautious about that. But I didn't have any problems with neck, 
shouoder, supper back, my legs, the pain, none of that until the accident in 1998. 
Hearing Transcript, page 57, lines 4-8. 
Q. Okay. If you did not have these neck and shoulder and low back problems, in 
your opinion, do you believe that you could still function as a - as an officer? 
A. Yes. 
Hearing Transcript, page 65, line 22 to page 66, line 18. by Attorney Lorri Lima. 
Q. My question goes to the amount of pain you felt. You characterized your pain 
in '98 as being something that was -that the kind of pain that you had never felt before. 
My question is: Did you feel that kind of pain related to your lower back pain in '90 --. 
A. Yes. 
Q. and'94? 
A. Yes. But in 1998, there was more on my body that was injured. In 1990 and 
'94, all I had was my lower back. It hurt immensely when I injured it. It got my 
attention. I went to the doctor. 
In 1998,1 re-injured my lower back and my neck and my shoulder and my 
hip from falling down the stairs. And I had immense pain through that area. And it 
continually go worse. 
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Q. So is it correct to say that it was a combination of all of the body parts that 
were in pain, that you felt such pain? 
A. Oh, I knew that I had - yes, that's correct. 
The matter should have been sent to a medical panel 
Judge Marlowe relies heavily on Dr. Chung's reports1. Nevertheless, the report is 
quite ambiguous and does not assist the trier in fact to determine all of the medical issues, 
including causation of the pain. Dr. Chung initially indicates direct medical causation 
with the industrial accident. He then reverses his opinion. He does not, however, recant 
his position concerning the aggravation of a pre-existing condition. In essence, he has 
confused the facts about whether the pain syndrome is caused, lighted up or aggravated 
from the industrial accident. Dr. Chung's opinion goes contrary to the treating 
physicians and creates more confusion as to the relationship between the upper extremity 
pain and the entire industrial injuries. It should be realized that the treating physicians 
maintain that the Applicant has, in fact, a form of myositis who still maintain the pain is 
indisputably and directly caused by the industrial accident of 5/14/1998. Dr. Chung's 
report clearly goes contrary to the AMA Guides for Evaluation of Permaneni Impairment. 
The Labor Commission has issued Guidelines when a Medical Panel must 
be convened. In Willardson v. Industrial Commission, 904 P.2d 671 (1995), the Supreme 
Court mandated the use of a Medical Panel even though the rule indicates "Guidelines". 
1
 Dr. Jeffrey Chung is well known in the workers compensation arena. He is a physiatrist that is often hired 
by Workers Compensation Fund to perform insurance medical examinations. In this case, Judge Marlowe 
cites 7 of the 9 medical causation findings of fact and attributes them to Dr. Chung and only cites to only 
one Finding of Fact by one treating physician for the Applicant. 
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R602-2-2, Guidelines for Utilization of Medical Panel. 
Pursuant to Section 34A-2-601, the Commission adopts the 
following guidelines in determining the necessity of submitting a case 
to a medical panel: 
A. A panel will be utilized by the Administrative Law Judge 
where one or more significant medical issues may be involved. 
Generally a significant medical issue must be shown by conflicting 
medical reports. Significant medical issues are involved when there 
are: 
1. Conflicting medical opinions related to causation of the 
injury or disease; 
2. Conflicting medical reports of permanent physical 
impairment which vary more than 5% of the whole person, 
3. Conflicting medical opinions as to the temporary total cutoff 
date which vary more than 90 days; 
4. Conflicting medical opinions related to a claim of permanent 
total disability, and/or 
5. Medical expenses in controversy amounting to more than 
$10,000. 
A Medical Panel is mandated in this situation as there are conflicting medical 
opinions relating to medical causation, conflicting medical reports indicating impairment 
of over 5%, conflicting medical opinions related to a claim of permanent total disability 
and conflicting opinions concerning medical expenses amounting to more than $10,000. 
By rule and mandate of the Supreme Court, the matter must be referred to a medical 
panel. 
Because of the unknown properties of the "cause" of the chronic pain syndrome, 
it should be considered as part of the industrial accident. 
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In Stoker v. Workers' Compensation Fund & Industrial Commission. 889 P.2d 
409, 411 (Utah 1994) this court stated: 'To give effect to that purpose, the Act should be 
liberally construed and applied to provide coverage. Any doubt respecting the right of 
compensation will be resolved in favor of the injured employee." State Tax Commission 
v. Industrial Commission, 685 P.2d 1051, 1053 (Utah 1984). The purpose of the workers 
compensation statute is to alleviate the financial hardship on individual employees and 
those dependent upon them by spreading the cost of an injury throughout the industry that 
employs the workers. Maryland Casualty Company v. Industrial Commission, 364 P.2d 
1020 (1961), Ortega v. Salt Lake Wet Wash Laundry, 156 P.2d 885, (1945). To further 
the purpose of the act, any doubt concerning the right of compensation must be resolved 
in favor of the injured worker and his dependents. Heaton v. Second Injury Fund, 796 
P.2d 676 (1990), J & W Janitorial Co. v. Industrial Commission, 61 P.2d 949 (1983), 
Kaiser Steel Corp v. Monfredi, 631 P.2d 888 (1981), McPhie v. Industrial Commission, 
567 P.2d 153 (1977). The Labor Commission has failed to even consider resolving any 
doubt of compensation in favor of Mr. Braegger. 
Odd Lot is still appropriate 
The odd lot doctrine "allows the Commission to find permanent total disability when 
a relatively small percentage of impairment caused by an industrial accident is combined 
with other factors to render the claimant unable to obtain employment." Zimmerman v. 
Industrial Commission, 785 P.2d 1127 (1989). In this case, it is agreed that the Applicant 
cannot perform the essential duties required in his occupation. It is further agreed that he 
cannot be rehabilitated. Further, the parties agree that there is no steady work that the 
Applicant can perform. 
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Odd Lot doctrine is quite similar to the Permanent Total Statute in that one looks at 
the combination of all impairments to determine whether the Applicant can return and 
whether the industrial accidents contribute to the inability to work. This is stipulated to 
and proven at hearing. 
In Smith v. Mity Lite, 939 P.2d 684 (1997), the Court of Appeals stated that the 
Labor Commission "did not take into consideration the extent to which his physical 
impairment, compounded by other factors, could render him totally disabled". In this 
case, Judge Marlowe improperly looked at the chronic pain syndrome and not all of the 
factors. Further, in Marshall v. Industrial Commission, 681 P.2d 208 (1984), the 
Commission denied an employee permanent total disability benefits solely on the 
percentage of impairment and the fact that the employee was eligible to retire. The 
Marshall Court determined that reliance on the impairment rating was improper as was 
done in this case. 
Judge Marlowe did not issue an award. 
The Labor Commission and Administrative Law Judge have certain duties and 
responsibilities to make appropriate Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Award. 
See Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-10. In Adams v. Board of Review, 821 P.2d 1 (Utah App. 
1991) the Court of Appeals requires an Agency "must make findings of fact and 
conclusions of law that are adequately detailed to permit meaningful appellate review". 
In Price River Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission, 731, P.2d 1079 (1986), the inadequacy 
of an administrative law judge's findings justified remanding the matter back to the 
hearing level for resolution of conflicting testimony, findings and determination. In 
review of the pleadings, Judge Marlowe only issued Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
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Law. While on page 8, she does indicate an Order, the order does not indicate the amount 
of the permanent partial impairment, nor when interest would begin to accumulate. 
Further there is no determination of when Mr. Braegger reached maximum medical 
improvement. Further, because there is no dollar amount ordered, there is no 
determination of attorney fees that would be deducted. Finally, Judge Marlowe does not 
indicate which medical expenses were reasonably related to the industrial accident and 
what medical visits were appropriate for determination of the travel allowance. In 
essence, the Labor Commission stated, "Defendants, you figure it all out". 
XL 
CONCLUSION 
This matter should be remanded back to the Labor Commission for referral to a 
medical panel. Further, the chronic pain syndrome should be related to the industrial 
accident either by cause, aggravation or being "lighted up" as a result of the industrial 
injury. Therefore, it should be compensable. Finally, the Order is not specific in 
determining benefits and should be remanded for clarification. 
DATED this 21st day of March, 2005. ^ ^ 
v.:. z^JfilJ (A 
David W. Parker 
Attorney for John Brent Braegger 
Applicant/Appellant/Petitioner 
24 
Case No: 20040825 
Certificate of Hand Delivery 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that two true and correct copy of foregoing document 
was hand delivered upon the following parties on this ^1 day of March, 2005. 
Alan Hennebold, Esq. 
Labor Commission of Utah 
Attorney For: Employers Reinsurance Fund 
Adjudication Division 
160 East 300 South, 3rd Floor 
P.O.Box 146615 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-6615 
Phone:(801)530-6800 
Fax: (801) 530-6804 
Floyd W. Holm 
Attorney For: Utah Dept. of Public Safety 
Workers Compensation Fund of Utah 
P.O. Box 57926 
Salt Lake City, UT 84157-0926 
Phone:(801)288-8059 
Fax:(801)288-8164 ^ 
V? 
/ / / 
" / 
XII. 
ADDENDUMS 
25 
UTAH LABOR COMMISSION 
ADJUDICATION DIVISION 
JOHN B. BRAEGGER, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
STATE OF UTAH DEPARTMENT OF 
PUBLIC SAFETY, WORKERS' 
COMPENSATION FUND, EMPLOYERS' 
REINSURANCE FUND, 
Respondents. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Case Nos. 2002496, 2002497,2002498 
Judge: DEIDRE MARLOWE 
Hearing: August 28, 2003 
Appearances: 
John B. Braegger, Petitioner, - David W. Parker, Attorney at Law 
Public Safety & WCF, Respondents - Floyd Holm, Attorney at Law 
ERF, Respondent - Lorrie Lima, Attorney at Law 
On April 24, 2002 Mr. Braegger filed three applications for hearing with three different 
injury dates: December 17, 1990 (Case No. 2002496); June 10, 1994 (Case No. 2002497); and 
May 14, 1998 (Case No. 2002948). All applications claim medical expenses, recommended 
medical care, temporary total compensation, permanent partial compensation, permanent total 
compensation, travel expenses, interest, and reimbursement to the Petitioner's private health 
insurance company. 
The Respondents agree that the Petitioner is unable to maintain substantial, gainful 
employment. The Respondents do not dispute the occurrence of the industrial injuries, but do 
dispute whether they are contributing, significant causes of the Petitioner's current condition, and 
therefore the other benefits are disputed as well. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. John B. Braegger worked for the Utah Department of Public Safety, Criminal 
Investigations Bureau as a police officer during all industrial events relevant to this claim. 
2. On December 18,1990 Petitioner was moving a file cabinet to retrieve an item he had 
dropped behind it when he felt a sharp pain in his lower back. He experienced pain, 
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numbness and tingling in his left leg, going down the front and side of his leg to his knee. 
He went to see Michael Smithers D.C. six or seven times for treatment. ME p. 160. 
Petitioner estimates that he got about 80% better, but the numbness and tingling never 
went away completely. 
3. On June 10, 1994 the department was moving offices from one floor to another. The 
Petitioner was moving a file cabinet and felt sharp pain again in his low back, and 
increased numbness and tingling in his left leg. His low back pain was increased too. 
4. For both of these injuries the doctors did not place Petitioner under any restrictions, but 
gave him exercises to do to strengthen the low back. This made him more "functional" 
but he still had pain. The Petitioner did not miss any days at work. 
5. Petitioner treated with Dr. Marble until November 15, 1994, at which time Dr. Marble 
indicated that there was nothing more to be done. ME p. 170. Petitioner didn't receive 
any treatment after that for his low back until the 1998 accident. 
6. On May 14, 1998 the Petitioner was starting to go down the stairs and overstepped the 
first stair and fell head over heels down a flight of about 13 metal, carpeted stairs. He hit 
his left cheek, low back, upper neck, left shoulder and left hip. The pain increased 
dramatically in his low back - there had always been some from the 1994 injury that had 
never gone away. He felt sharp pain, described as a "sharp shock" going down into his 
left arm and fingers. 
7. Shortly after the 1998 injury, the Petitioner began experiencing diffuse pain, loss of 
strength, and stamina to walk. He experienced difficulty getting in and out of chairs and 
vehicles, and going up and down stairs became very difficult. He started to use the 
elevator to get to his floor at work because of pain and weakness. He did not have these 
symptoms prior to the 1998 injury. 
8. The Petitioner also began to have sweating at nights and great pain, waking up every two 
hours or so. He clenched his teeth because of the pain and broke off his front teeth at the 
gums during one night. Clenching and bruxing continued to be a problem and Petitioner 
had to wear a night guard to protect the remaining dental work. Petitioner needs to have 
the bridge replaced and implants done to replace the missing teeth. 
9. Petitioner continued working after the May 1998 injury until March 15, 2001, when he 
failed a fitness for duty test due to his chronic pain condition and weakness. The 
Petitioner believes that he would have continued working had the only health conditions 
been his spinal and shoulder conditions rather than the chronic pain sydrome and related 
symptomology. 
10. Since 1998 Petitioner has had no other traumatic injuries. 
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11. Dr. Don L. Stromquist evaluated the Petitioner on September 17, 2002 and concludes that 
the Petitioner suffers from a chronic pain syndrome, which is not polymyositis. Dr. 
Stromquist also recognizes the spinal injuries and a rotator cuff tear. Dr. Stromquist also 
indicates that the Petitioner has permanent functional restrictions that effectively make 
him incapable of employment. ME p. 55. 
12. Dr. Stromquist indicates that the structural disease of Petitioner's spine is most likely less 
than 50% of his overall impairment. The "greater part of [Petitioner's] impairment, 
something over 50%/' is created by his chronic pain syndrome." ME p. 55. 
13. Dr. Jeff B. Chung began treating the Petitioner and first opined that the chronic pain and 
weakness was due to a rheumatologic condition which was accelerated by the 1998 
injury. ME p. 47. But on October 17, 2002 Dr. Chung indicates that his five opinions of 
4/18/00 through 8/8/02 were based on an assumption that the Petitioner did in fact have 
polymyositis. Since that diagnosis turned out to be incorrect and was a critical 
component of his previous reports, Dr. Chung indicates that those reports are flawed and 
should not be considered to be an accurate representation of the Petitioner's current 
medical state. ME p. 9. 
14. Dr. Chung indicates that there is no question that Petitioner has a rotator cuff tear and 
severe degenerative processes in both cervical and lumbar regions, which he attributes to 
the three accident dates at issue. ME p. 15. Dr. Chung recommends surgery to correct 
the rotator cuff repair. ME p. 20. 
15. Dr. Chung indicates that it cannot be determined that there is a medical causal link 
between the chronic pain symptomology, which includes weakness, night sweats, leg 
cramps, swelling, and tingling in arms and hands, and the industrial accident of May 14, 
1998, even though these symptoms occurred after the accident. ME p. 11. These 
symptoms are also not related to or caused by the degenerative spinal conditions, which 
are industrial related. ME, p. 12, 47. 
16. Dr. Chung gives a 5% per whole person impairment for the cervical injuries, all 
attributable to the 1998 injury. He gives a 5% whole person impairment to the lumbar 
condition (including the hip condition, ME p. 2), and apportions an equal amount of 
causation to each of the three industrial injuries. ME p. 15. He gives a 1% whole person 
impairment to the left rotator cuff tear, all attributable to the 1998 injury. ME p. 16. Dr. 
Chung also gives the Petitioner a 6% whole person impairment rating for his diabetes and 
diabetes-related four extremity peripheral polyneuropathies. ME p. 16. 
17. Dr. Chung opines that 50% of the Petitioner's current condition is related to the structural 
pathology of the spine, but that the chronic pain syndrome is the clinical entity that is 
most likely causing Petitioner to be disabled. ME p. 16. Dr. Chung indicates that 
Petitioner is unable to work because of the chronic pain condition, and not the spinal and 
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shoulder injuries related to the industrial injury, and that vocational retraining would 
likely not be of significant benefit. ME p. 17. Dr. Chung allows Petitioner to be at MMI 
three to four weeks after April 18, 2000, whether he shows any progression or not. ME p. 
48. 
18. The Petitioner was found to be disabled for purposes of Social Security disability on 
March 15, 2001. 
19. The Parties stipulated that the proper compensation rate for the Petitioner would be the 
maximum rate in any year of injury. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Medical Causation 
Petitioner must show that any conditions for which he claims benefits are medically 
causally related to the industrial injury. Allen v. Industrial Commission, 729 P.2d 15, 27 (Utah 
1986). The burden of proof is on the Petitioner. 
The Petitioner argues that the question is not whether there is a label or diagnosis on the 
chronic pain condition, but whether the condition relates to the 1998 injury. I agree. Petitioner 
further argues that because onset of the chronic pain syndrome was right after the 1998 injury, it 
is causally related. However, there is nothing in the medical records which relates this syndrome 
to the injury, and it is simply not enough to show that the onset was subsequent to the accident in 
the absence of any medical link. Therefore, I conclude that there is insufficient evidence to show 
by a preponderance that the chronic pain syndrome, related symptomology, and subsequent 
dental injuries, were caused by the 1998 injury, and thus the Petitioner is not entitled to workers' 
compensation benefits regarding these conditions. 
Dr. Chung indicates that there is no question that Petitioner has a rotator cuff tear and 
severe degenerative processes in both cervical and lumbar regions, which he attributes to the 
three accident dates at issue. ME p. 15. There are no opposing medical opinions and it appears 
that Dr. Chung's indications as to medical causation on the cervical, lumbar, and shoulder 
regions is based on a reasoned medical opinion. Therefore I conclude that the Petitioner has 
shown that he is entitled to benefits with regard to these medical conditions. 
2. Medical Expenses and Recommended Medical Care 
Under U.C.A. § 34A-2-401 and 2-418 an employee may recover medical expenses for 
medical care which is necessary and reasonably related to injuries occurring in the course and 
scope of his or her employment. 
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The Petitioner may recover expenses and medical care related to his cervical, lumbar, and 
shoulder regions, including the proposed rotator cuff repair. Though not opposed, it is not clear 
from the record whether rotator cuff surgery is currently recommended. Dr. Chung did 
recommend it at one time. ME p. 20. If it is still currently recommended, Petitioner is entitled to 
expenses for that surgery. 
3. Temporary Total Compensation 
Utah Code Annotated § 34A-2-410 reads: 
(l)(a) In case of temporary disability, so long as the disability is total, the employee shall 
receive 66 2/3 of that employee's average weekly wages at the time of the injury . . . . 
The Petitioner missed no work days with the 1990 and 1994 injuries and thus is not 
entitled to temporary total compensation benefits for those dates. There was no evidence 
presented of time off work with regard to the injury in 1998, and the Petitioner continued 
working until March 15, 2001, from which date permanent total compensation is claimed. Thus 
no temporary total compensation is awarded. 
4. Permanent Partial Compensation 
Utah Code Annotated § 34A-2-412 reads: 
(1) An employee who sustained a permanent impairment as a result of an industrial 
accident aud who files an application for hearing under Section 34A-2-417 may 
receive a permanent partial disability award from the commission. 
(6)(a) For any permanent impairment caused by an industrial accident that is not 
otherwise provided for in the schedule of losses in this section, permanent partial 
disability compensation shali be awarded by the commission based on the medical 
evidence. 
See also Utah Administrative Code Rule 612-7-3 Method for Rating. 
Dr. Chung gives a 5% per whole person impairment for the cervical injuries, all 
attributable to the 1998 injury. He gives a 5% whole person impairment to the lumbar condition 
(including the hip condition, ME p. 2), and apportions an equal amount of causation to each of 
the three industrial injuries. ME p. 15. He gives a 1% whole person impairment to the left 
rotator cuff tear, all attributable to the 1998 injury. ME p. 16. These ratings are undisputed and 
the Petitioner is entitled to permanent partial compensation for these ratings at the maximum rate 
in force in the year of the injury. 
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5. Permanent Total Compensation 
The parties agree that the Petitioner is and has been for some time incapable of sustaining 
gainful employment due to his current health problems. Because parts of this current condition 
are apportioned among the various injury dates, and the law in effect when the injury was 
sustained governs the analysis, it appears necessary to look at the ruling statutes for the different 
injury years. 
For the 1990 and 1994 injuries, Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-67 required an analysis 
substantively similar to the Social Security Administration, which is set forth in Utah 
Administrative Code Rule 612-1-10, as follows: 
2. For claims arising from accident or disease on or after July 1, 1998 and prior to 
May 1, 1995, the Commission is required under Section 34A-2-413, to make a 
finding of total disability as measured by the substance of the sequential decision-
making process of the Social Security Administrative under Title 20 of the Code 
of Federal Regulations, amended April 1, 1993. The use of the term "substance of 
the sequential decision-making process" is deemed to confer some latitude on the 
Commission in exercising a degree of discretion in making its findings relative to 
permanent total disability.... 
B(3) . . . The sequential decision making process referred to requires a series of 
questions and evaluations to be made in sequence. In short., these are: 
a. . Is the claimant engaged in a substantial gainful activity? 
b. Does the claimant have a medically severe impairment? 
c. Does the severe impairment meet or equal the duration requirement 
in 20 CFR 404.1509, amended April 1, 1993, and the listed 
impairments of 20 CFR Subpart P Appendix 1, amended April 1, 
1993? 
d. Does the impairment prevent the claimant from doing past relevant 
work? 
e. Does the impairment prevent the claimant from doing any other 
work? 
Because neither the 1990 or 1994 injuries, separately or together, prevented the Petitioner 
from doing past relevant work or any other work, the Petitioner is not permanently and totally 
disabled due to either of them, jointly or separately. 
The 1998 injury has to be evaluated under § 34A-2-413 (1995), which reads in relevant 
portion as follows: 
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(l)(a) In cases of permanent total disability resulting from an industrial accident or 
occupational disease, the employee shall receive compensation as outlined in this 
section. 
(b) To establish entitlement to permanent total disability compensation, the employee 
has the burden of proof to show by a preponderance of evidence that: 
(i) the employee sustained a significant impairment or combination of 
impairments as a result of the industrial accident or occupational disease 
that gives rise to the permanent total disability entitlement; 
(ii) the employee is permanently totally disabled; and 
(iii) the industrial accident or occupational disease was the direct cause of the 
employee's permanent total disability. 
(c) To find an employee permanently totally disabled, the commission shall conclude 
that: 
(i) the employee is not gainfully employed; 
(ii) the employee has an impairment or combination of impairments that limit 
the employee's ability to do basic work activities; 
(iii) the industrial or occupationally caused impairment or combination of 
impairments prevent the employee from performing the essential functions 
of the work activities for which the employee has been qualified until the 
time of the industrial accident or occupational disease that is the basis for 
the employee's permanent total disability claim; and 
(iv) the employee cannot perform other work reasonably available, taking into 
coLsideration the employee's age, education, past work experience, 
medical capacity, and residual functional capacity. 
The Petitioner probably meets the requirements of subparagraph (c), (and therefore 
(b)(ii)), as he is not gainfully employed and Drs. Chung and Stromquist indicate he cannot 
functionally perform his previous employment or any other employment. 
Furthermore, I conclude that Petitioner meets the requirement of (b)(ii) to have significant 
impairments or combinations of impairments because his cervical, lumbar and shoulder injuries 
from the 1998 injury all resulted in permanent impairment ratings of 5%, 1/3 of 5%, and 1%, 
respectively. 
However, the issue is whether the combination of these industrially-caused significant 
impairments "give rise to" and are the "direct cause" of the permanent total disability, as required 
by (b)(i) and (b)(iii). Dr. Stromquist indicates that the structural disease of Petitioner's spine is 
most likely less than 50% of his overall impairment. The "greater part of [Petitioner's] 
impairment, something over 50%," is created by his chronic pain syndrome." ME p. 55. Dr. 
Chung opines that 50% of the Petitioner's current condition is related to the structural pathology 
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of the spine, but that the chronic pain syndrome is the clinical entity that is most likely causing 
Petitioner to be disabled. ME p. 16. Furthermore, the evidence shows that Petitioner continued 
working after the May 1998 injury until March 15, 2001, when he failed a fitness for duty test 
due to his chronic pain condition and weakness. The Petitioner also testified that he would have 
continued working had the only conditions been his spinal and shoulder conditions rather than 
the chronic pain symptomology. I therefore conclude that the industrial injuries did not "give 
rise to" or provide the "direct cause" of Petitioner's permanent total disability, and the claim for 
permanent total compensation will be dismissed. 
6. Employers' Reinsurance Fund (ERF) 
Utah Code Annotated § 34A-2-703 indicates: 
If an employee, who has at least a 10% whole person permanent impairment from any 
cause or origin, subsequently incurs an additional impairment by an accident arising out of and in 
the course of the employee's employment during the period of July 1, 1988 to June 30, 1994, 
inclusive, and if the additional impairment results in permanent total disability, the employer or 
its insurance carrier and the Employers' Reinsurance Fund are liable for the payment of 
benefits . . . . 
Because I have concluded that the 1990 and 1994 injuries do not result in a permanent 
total disability, the ERF has no liability for any award herein. 
ORDER 
Good cause appearing therefore, IT IS ORDERED that the claims for temporary 1otal 
compensation and permanent total compensation are dismissed with prejudice. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that claims for medical expenses, recommended medical care, 
permanent partial impairment, travel expenses, and reimbursement to Mr. Braegger's private 
health insurance for symptoms related to the chronic pain syndrome are dismissed with prejudice. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the State of Utah Department of Public Safety, and/or the 
Workers' Compensation Fund, pay permanent partial impairment ratings as outlined in Dr. 
Chung's report for the cervical, lumbar, and shoulder injuries to John B. Braegger, in accordance 
with Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-412 at the maximum compensation rate for the year of the injury. 
Any unpaid amounts to date are due and payable in a lump sum, plus interest at eight percent 
(8%) per annum, under U.C.A. § 34A-2-420(3) and Utah Administrative Code, Rule 612-1-5. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that statutory attorney's fees shall be deducted from the 
compensation awarded above to John Braegger, and sent directly to David W. Parker, according 
to U.C.A. 34A-1-309 and U.A.C. Rule 602-2-4. 
t 
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the State of Utah Department of Public Safety, and/or the 
Workers' Compensation Fund shall pay all medical expenses reasonably related to John 
Braegger's industrial injuries, according to U.C.A. § 34A-2-418, and the medical and surgical fee 
schedule of the Utah Labor Commission and further travel allowances under Utah Administrative 
Code, Rule 612-2-20, plus interest at eight percent (8%) per annum. 
Issued this day of March, 2004 
Deidre Marlowe 
Administrative Law Judge 
NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 
A party aggrieved by the decision may file a Motion for Review with the Adjudication 
Division of the Utah Labor Commission. The Motion for Review must set forth the specific 
basis for review and must be received by the Commission within 30 days from the date this 
decision is signed. Other parties may then submit their Responses to the Motion for Review 
within 20 days of the Motion for Review. 
Any party may request that the Appeals Board of the Utah Labor Commission conduct the 
foregoing review. Such request must be included in the party's Motion for Review or its 
Response. If none of the parties specifically requests review by the Appeals Board, the review 
will be conducted by the Utah Labor Commissioner. 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing instrument was mailed first 
class, postage prepaid, on the Jj£_ day of March, 2004 to the following: 
John Braegger 
867 W. 550 North 
West Bountiful, UT 84087 
Floyd W. Holm 
Workers' Compensation Fund 
392 East 6400 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84107 
David W. Parker 
Attorney at Law 
11075 S. State St., Ste. 13 
Sandy, UT 84070-5512 
UTAH LABOR COMMISSION 
JOHN B. BRAEGGER, * 
* 
Applicant, * ORDER DENYING 
* MOTION FOR REVIEW 
v. * 
STATE OF UTAH (DEPARTMENT * 
OF PUBLIC SAFETY), WORKERS * 
COMPENSATION FUND and * Case Nos. 02-0496 through 
EMPLOYERS' REINSURANCE FUND, * 02-0498 
* 
Defendants. * 
John B. Braegger asks the Utah Labor Commission to review Administrative Law Judge 
Marlowe's decision regarding Mr. Braegger's claim for benefits under the Utah Workers' 
Compensation Act ("the Act"; Title 34A, Chapter 2, Utah Code Annotated). 
The Labor Commission exercises jurisdiction over this motion for review pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. §63-46b-12 and Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-801(3). 
BACKGROUND AND ISSUES PRESENTED 
On April 24,2002 Mr. Braegger filed three applications for workers' compensation benefits 
with the Commission's Adjudication Division. These applications claimed workers' compensation 
benefits from the State of Utah and its insurance carrier, Workers Compensation Fund (referred to 
jointly as "the State" hereafter), for injuries allegedly caused by three separate accidents Mr. 
Braegger experienced while working for the State. 
Judge Marlowe held an evidentiary hearing on Mr. Braegger's claims on August 28,2003. 
On March 18, 2004, Judge Marlowe issued her decision. In summary, Judge Marlowe concluded 
Mr. Braegger had suffered work-related cervical, lumbar and shoulder injuries and was entitled to 
benefits for those injuries. However, Judge Marlowe determined that Mr. Braegger's chronic pain 
syndrome was not work-related. Judge Marlowe therefore denied benefits for that condition. 
Finally, Judge Marlowe concluded that Mr. Braegger's continuing disability is due to his chronic 
pain syndrome, rather than his work-related injuries. For that reason, Judge Marlowe denied Mr. 
Braegger's claim for permanent total disability compensation. 
Mr. Braegger now seeks Commission review of Judge Marlowe's decision on the grounds 
that: 1) his chronic pain is the result of his work accidents; 2) a medical panel should be appointed 
to consider his claims; 3) even if his chronic pain is not work-related, his other work-related injuries 
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justify an award of permanent total disability compensation; and 4) Judge Marlowe's order lacks 
specificity. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
The Commission affirms and adopts Judge Marlowe's findings of fact. 
In accepting Judge Marlowe's findings, the Commission notes Mr. Braegger's argument that 
his accidents at work caused his chronic pain. However, despite Mr. Braegger's lengthy argument as 
to why a conclusion of medical causation should be reached, none of the medical experts have 
expressed that conclusion. The Commission therefore agrees with Judge Marlowe that Mr. Braegger 
has failed to meet his burden of proof on the question of medical causation. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION OF LAW 
The remainder of Mr. Braegger's motion for review deals with the proper application of the 
Workers' Compensation Act to the facts of Mr. Braegger's claim. 
Mr. Braegger argues that Judge Marlowe should have exercised her discretion under §34A-2-
601 of the Act to appoint a medical panel to consider the medical aspects of his claim. The 
Commission's Rule 602-2-2 sets forth the conditions for appointment of medical panels and 
envisions their use when the record contains conflicting medical opinions on significant medical 
issues. In other words, medical panels are used to resolve medical conflicts, not create them. In this 
case, Mr. Braegger has not established that a conflict of medical opinion exists. It is therefore 
unnecessary to appoint a medical panel. 
Mr. Braegger also argues that, even if his chronic pain is not work-related, his work-related 
cervical, lumbar and shoulder injuries are sufficient to qualify him for permanent total disability 
compensation. The Commission disagrees. As Judge Marlowe observed, Mr. Braegger stopped 
working because of his chronic pain and weakness. Mr. Braegger himself acknowledges that his 
cervical, lumbar and shoulder injuries did not prevent him from working. It was his chronic pain and 
weakness that took him out of the labor force. The Commission therefore concludes that Mr. 
Braegger has failed to meet §34A-2-413(l)(b)(iii)'s requirement that the work accident was the 
"direct cause" of his permanent total disability.1 
l Among its several criteria for permanent total disability claims, §34A-2-413(l)(c)(iii)of the Act 
requires that "the industrial. . . impairment or combination of impairments prevent the employee 
from performing the essential functions of the work activities for which the employee has been 
qualified until the time of the industrial accident... " Without discussing the point, Judge Marlowe 
observed that Mr. Braegger "probably meets" the foregoing requirement. The Commission disagrees. 
The preponderance of evidence does not establish that Mr. Braegger's work-related impairments 
prevent him from performing his pre-accident work activities. Therefore, Mr. Braegger's claim for 
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Mr. Braegger contends that the Commission should award permanent total disability 
compensation to him under the "Odd Lot Doctrine." While the Odd Lot Doctrine was historically 
recognized as a part of Utah's workers' compensation system, in 1995 the Utah Legislature amended 
§34A-2-413 of the Act to establish specific criteria for determining whether an injured worker is 
permanently and totally disabled. The Commission is now required to evaluate Mr. Braegger's claim 
for permanent total disability compensation according to the statutory requirements of §34A-2-413. 
Finally, Mr. Braegger contends Judge Marlowe's decision is inadequate because it does not 
state the precise dollar amounts Mr. Braegger should receive, or identify the specific medical care 
that must be paid by the State. The Commission notes that, although Mr. Braegger complains of a 
lack of specificity in Judge Marlowe's order, he has not submitted a computation of the award he 
believes is correct. 
Judge Marlowe's order correctly states the variables to be used by the parties in computing 
Mr. Braegger's benefits. While the calculations are complex, they can be easily accomplished by 
insurance carriers. Of course, if Mr. Braegger disagrees with the insurance carrier's computation of 
benefits, he can then bring the matter to Judge Marlowe's attention. The same is true for any 
disagreement over liability for medical treatment. But at this time there is no dispute and the 
Commission sees no need to intervene. 
ORDER 
The Commission affirms Judge Marlowe's decision and denies Mr. Braegger's motion for 
review. It is so ordered. 
Dated this H day of September, 2004. 
R. Lee Ellertson 
Utah Labor Commissioner 
t&A&L&Z'l-^ 
IMPORTANT! NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS FOLLOWS ON NEXT PAGE. 
permanent total disability compensation must be denied under §34A-2-413(1 )(c)(iii)of the Act as 
well as for the reasons stated in Judge Marlowe's decision. 
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NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 
Any party may ask the Labor Commission to reconsider this Order. Any such request for 
reconsideration must be received by the Labor Commission within 20 days of the date of this order. 
Alternatively, any party may appeal this order to the Utah Court of Appeals by filing a petition for 
review with the court. Any such petition for review must be received by the court within 30 days of 
the date of this order. 
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34A-2-413. Permanent total disability — Amount of payments — Rehabilitation. 
(1) (a) In cases of permanent total disability resulting from an industrial accident or occupational 
disease, the employee shall receive compensation as outlined in this section. 
(b) To establish entitlement to permanent total disability compensation, the employee has the burden 
of proof to show by a preponderance of evidence that: 
(i) the employee sustained a significant impairment or combination of impairments as a result of the 
industrial accident or occupational disease that gives rise to the permanent total disability entitlement; 
(ii) the employee is permanently totally disabled; and 
(iii) the industrial accident or occupational disease was the direct cause of the employee's permanent 
total disability. 
(c) To find an employee permanently totally disabled, the commission shall conclude that: 
(i) the employee is not gainfully employed; 
(ii) the employee has an impairment or combination of impairments that limit the employee's ability 
to do basic work activities; 
(iii) the industrial or occupationally caused impairment or combination of impairments prevent the 
employee from performing the essential functions of the work activities for which the employee has 
been qualified until the time of the industrial accident or occupational disease that is the basis for the 
employee's permanent total disability claim; and 
(iv) the employee cannot perform other work reasonably available, taking into consideration the 
employee's age, education, past work experience, medical capacity, and residual functional capacity. 
(d) Evidence of an employee's entitlement to disability benefits other than those provided under this 
chapter and Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act, if relevant, may be presented to the commission, 
but is not binding and creates no presumption of an entitlement under this chapter and Chapter 3, Utah 
Occupational Disease Act. 
(2) For permanent total disability compensation during the initial 312-week entitlement, 
compensation shall be 66-2/3% of the employee's average weekly wage at the time of the injury, limited 
as follows: 
(a) compensation per week may not be more than 85% of the state average weekly wage at the time 
of the injury; 
(b) compensation per week may not be less than the sum of $45 per week, plus $5 for a dependent 
spouse, plus $5 for each dependent child under the age of 18 years, up to a maximum of four dependent 
minor children, but not exceeding the maximum established in Subsection (2)(a) nor exceeding the 
average weekly wage of the employee at the time of the injury; and 
(c) after the initial 312 weeks, the minimum weekly compensation rate under Subsection (2)(b) shall 
be 36% of the current state average weekly wage, rounded to the nearest dollar. 
(3) For claims resulting from an accident or disease arising out of and in the course of the employee's 
employment on or before June 30, 1994: 
(a) The employer or its insurance carrier is liable for the initial 312 weeks of permanent total 
disability compensation except as outlined in Section 34A-2-703 as in effect on the date of injury. 
(b) The employer or its insurance carrier may not be required to pay compensation for any 
combination of disabilities of any kind, as provided in this section and Sections 34A-2-410 
through 34A-2-412 and Sections 34A-2-501 through 34A-2-507 in excess of the amount of 
compensation payable over the initial 312 weeks at the applicable permanent total disability 
compensation rate under Subsection (2). 
(c) Any overpayment of this compensation shall be reimbursed to the employer or its insurance 
carrier by the Employers' Reinsurance Fund and shall be paid out of the Employers' Reinsurance Fund's 
liability to the employee. 
(d) After an employee has received compensation from the employee's employer, its insurance 
carrier, or the Employers' Reinsurance Fund for any combination of disabilities amounting to 312 weeks 
of compensation at the applicable permanent total disability compensation rate, the Employers' 
teinsurance Fund shall pay all remaining permanent total disability compensation. 
(e) Employers' Reinsurance Fund payments shall commence immediately after the employer or its 
asurance carrier has satisfied its liability under Subsection (3) or Section 34A-2-703. 
(4) For claims resulting from an accident or disease arising out of and in the course of the employee's 
mployment on or after July 1, 1994: 
(a) The employer or its insurance carrier is liable for permanent total disability compensation. 
(b) The employer or its insurance carrier may not be required to pay compensation for any 
ombination of disabilities of any kind, as provided in this section and Sections 34A-2-410 through 
4A-2-412 and Sections 34A-2-501 through 34A-2-507, in excess of the amount of compensation 
>ayable over the initial 312 weeks at the applicable permanent total disability compensation rate under 
lubsection (2). 
(c) Any overpayment of this compensation shall be recouped by the employer or its insurance carrier 
y reasonably offsetting the overpayment against future liability paid before or after the initial 312 
/eeks. 
(5) Notwithstanding the minimum rate established m Subsection (2), the compensation payable by 
le employer, its insurance carrier, or the Employers' Reinsurance Fund, after an employee has received 
ompensation from the employer or the employer's insurance carrier for any combination of disabilities 
mounting to 312 weeks of compensation at the applicable total disability compensation rate, shall be 
educed, to the extent allowable by law, by the dollar amount of 50% of the Social Security retirement 
enefits received by the employee during the same period. 
(6) (a) A finding by the commission of permanent total disability is not final, unless otherwise agreed 
3 by the parties, until: 
(i) an administrative law judge reviews a summary of reemployment activities undertaken pursuant to 
"hapter 8, Utah Injured Worker Reemployment Act; 
(ii) the employer or its insurance carrier submits to the administrative law judge a reemployment plan 
s prepared by a qualified rehabilitation provider reasonably designed to return the employee to gainful 
mployment or the employer or its insurance carrier provides the administrative law judge notice that 
le employer or its insurance carrier will not submit a plan; and 
(iii) the administrative law judge, after notice to the parties, holds a hearing, unless otherwise 
tipulated, to consider evidence regarding rehabilitation and to review any reemployment plan submitted 
y the employer or its insurance carrier under Subsection (6)(a)(ii). 
(b) Prior to the finding becoming final, the administrative law judge shall order: 
(i) the initiation of permanent total disability compensation payments to provide for the employee's 
ubsistence; and 
(ii) the payment of any undisputed disability or medical benefits due the employee. 
(c) The employer or its insurance carrier shall be given credit for any disability payments made under 
ubsection (6)(b) against its ultimate disability compensation liability under this chapter or Chapter 3, 
Jtah Occupational Disease Act. 
(d) An employer or its insurance carrier may not be ordered to submit a reemployment plan. If the 
mployer or its insurance carrier voluntarily submits a plan, the plan is subject to Subsections (6)(d)(i) 
Trough (iii). 
(i) The plan may include retraining, education, medical and disability compensation benefits, job 
lacement services, or incentives calculated to facilitate reemployment funded by the employer or its 
lsurance carrier. 
(ii) The plan shall include payment of reasonable disability compensation to provide for the 
mployee's subsistence during the rehabilitation process. 
(iii) The employer or its insurance carrier shall diligently pursue the reemployment plan. The 
mployer's or insurance carrier's failure to diligently pursue the reemployment plan shall be cause for the 
dministrative law judge on the administrative law judge's own motion to make a final decision of 
permanent total disability. 
(e) If a preponderance of the evidence shows that successful rehabilitation is not possible, the 
administrative law judge shall order that the employee be paid weekly permanent total disability 
compensation benefits. 
(7) (a) The period of benefits commences on the date the employee became permanently totally 
disabled, as determined by a final order of the commission based on the facts and evidence, and ends: 
(i) with the death of the employee; or 
(ii) when the employee is capable of returning to regular, steady work. 
(b) An employer or its insurance carrier may provide or locate for a permanently totally disabled 
employee reasonable, medically appropriate, part-time work in a job earning at least minimum wage 
provided that employment may not be required to the extent that it would disqualify the employee from 
Social Security disability benefits. 
(c) An employee shall fully cooperate in the placement and employment process and accept the 
reasonable, medically appropriate, part-time work. 
(d) In a consecutive four-week period when an employee's gross income from the work provided 
under Subsection (7)(b) exceeds $500, the employer or insurance carrier may reduce the employee's 
permanent total disability compensation by 50% of the employee's income in excess of $500. 
(e) If a work opportunity is not provided by the employer or its insurance carrier, a permanently 
totally disabled employee may obtain medically appropriate, part-time work subject to the offset 
provisions contained in Subsection (7)(d). 
(f) (i) The commission shall establish rules regarding the part-time work and offset. 
(ii) The adjudication of disputes arising under Subsection (7) is governed by Part 8, Adjudication. 
(g) The employer or its insurance carrier shall have the burden of proof to show that medically 
appropriate part-time work is available. 
(h) The administrative law judge may: 
(i) excuse an employee from participation in any job that would require the employee to undertake 
work exceeding the employee's medical capacity and residual functional capacity or for good cause; or 
(ii) allow the employer or its insurance carrier to reduce permanent total disability benefits as 
provided in Subsection (7)(d) when reasonable, medically appropriate, part-time employment has been 
offered but the employee has failed to fully cooperate. 
(8) When an employee has been rehabilitated or the employee's rehabilitation is possible but the 
employee has some loss of bodily function, the award shall be for permanent partial disability. 
(9) As determined by an administrative law judge, an employee is not entitled to disability 
compensation, unless the employee fully cooperates with any evaluation or reemployment plan under 
this chapter or Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act. The administrative law judge shall dismiss 
without prejudice the claim for benefits of an employee if the administrative law judge finds that the 
employee fails to fully cooperate, unless the administrative law judge states specific findings on the 
record justifying dismissal with prejudice. 
(10) (a) The loss or permanent and complete loss of the use of both hands, both arms, both feet, both 
legs, both eyes, or any combination of two such body members constitutes total and permanent 
disability, to be compensated according to this section. 
(b) A finding of permanent total disability pursuant to Subsection (10)(a) is final. 
(11) (a) An insurer or self-insured employer may periodically reexamine a permanent total disability 
claim, except those based on Subsection (10), for which the insurer or self-insured employer had or has 
payment responsibility to determine whether the worker remains permanently totally disabled. 
(b) Reexamination may be conducted no more than once every three years after an award is final, 
unless good cause is shown by the employer or its insurance carrier to allow more frequent 
reexaminations. 
(c) The reexamination may include: 
(i) the review of medical records; 
(ii) employee submission to reasonable medical evaluations; 
(iii) employee submission to reasonable rehabilitation evaluations and retraining efforts; 
(iv) employee disclosure of Federal Income Tax Returns; 
(v) employee certification of compliance with Section 34A-2-110; and 
(vi) employee completion of sworn affidavits or questionnaires approved by the division. 
(d) The insurer or self insured employer shall pay for the cost of a reexamination with appropriate 
mployee reimbursement pursuant to rule for reasonable travel allowance and per diem as well as 
^asonable expert witness fees incurred by the employee in supporting the employee's claim for 
ermanent total disability benefits at the time of reexamination. 
(e) If an employee fails to fully cooperate in the reasonable reexamination of a permanent total 
isability finding, an administrative law judge may order the suspension of the employee's permanent 
)tal disability benefits until the employee cooperates with the reexamination. 
(f) (i) Should the reexamination of a permanent total disability finding reveal evidence that 
^asonably raises the issue of an employee's continued entitlement to permanent total disability 
ompensation benefits, an insurer or self-insured employer may petition the Division of Adjudication for 
rehearing on that issue. The petition shall be accompanied by documentation 
jpporting the insurer's or self-insured employer's belief that the employee is no longer permanently 
)tally disabled. 
(ii) If the petition under Subsection (1 l)(f)(i) demonstrates good cause, as determined by the Division 
f Adjudication, an administrative law judge shall adjudicate the issue at a hearing. 
(iii) Evidence of an employee's participation in medically appropriate, part-time work may not be the 
3le basis for termination of an employee's permanent total disability entitlement, but the evidence of the 
[nployee's participation in medically appropriate, part-time work under Subsection (7) may be 
onsidered in the reexamination or hearing with other evidence relating to the employee's status and 
ondition. 
(g) In accordance with Section 34A-1-309, the administrative law judge may award reasonable 
ttorneys fees to an attorney retained by an employee to represent the employee's interests with respect 
) reexamination of the permanent total disability finding, except if the employee does not prevail, the 
ttorneys fees shall be set at $1,000. The attorneys fees shall be paid by the employer or its insurance 
airier in addition to the permanent total disability compensation benefits due. 
(h) During the period of reexamination or adjudication if the employee fully cooperates, each insurer, 
slf-insured employer, or the Employers' Reinsurance Fund shall continue to pay the permanent total 
isability compensation benefits due the employee. 
(12) If any provision of this section, or the application of any provision to any person or 
ircumstance, is held invalid, the remainder of this section shall be given effect without the invalid 
rovision or application. 
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This rule is enacted under the authority of Sections 34A-1-104 and 34A-2-412. 
The definition of impairment in Section 34A-2-102 applies to this rule. 
R6.12-7-3. Method for Rating, 
A. For rating all impairments, which are not expressly listed in Section 34A-2-412, the 
Commission adopts "Utah's 2002 Impairment Guides" as published by the Commission for all 
injuries rated on or after January 1, 2002. For those conditions not found in "Utah's 2002 
Impairment Guides," the American Medical Association's "Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent 
Impairment, Fifth Edition" are to be used. 
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63-46b-10. Procedures for formal adjudicative proceedings — Orders. 
In formal adjudicative proceedings: 
(1) Within a reasonable time after the hearing, or after the filing of any posthearing documents 
permitted by the presiding officer, or within the time required by any applicable statute or rule of the 
agency, the presiding officer shall sign and issue an order that includes: 
(a) a statement of the presiding officer's findings of fact based exclusively on the evidence of record 
in the adjudicative proceedings or on facts officially noted; 
(b) a statement of the presiding officer's conclusions of law; 
(c) a statement of the reasons for the presiding officer's decision; 
(d) a statement of any relief ordered by the agency; 
(e) a notice of the right to apply for reconsideration; 
(f) a notice of any right to administrative or judicial review of the order available to aggrieved 
parties; and 
(g) the time limits applicable to any reconsideration or review. 
(2) The presiding officer may use the presiding officer's experience, technical competence, and 
specialized knowledge to evaluate the evidence. 
(3) A finding of fact that was contested may not be based solely on hearsay evidence unless that 
evidence is admissible under the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
(4) This section does not preclude the presiding officer from issuing interim orders to: 
(a) notify the parties of further hearings; 
(b) notify the parties of provisional rulings on a portion of the issues presented; or 
(c) otherwise provide for the fair and efficient conduct of the adjudicative proceeding. 
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opinion and--and, if it's a lay opinion then it's 
not really relevant. 
MR. PARKER: Your Honor, I was going 
to--my next question was, you know: Why do you 
believe that? And so that would cover the 
foundation aspect. 
MR. HOLM: Well, a foundation for an 
opinion, but is his opinion as a layperson 
relevant, Your Honor? That's the more fundamental 
que s t i on. 
THE COURT: Well, I understand that. I 
mean, it will just go to the weight of what he 
says. 
BY MR. PARKER 
Q. Brent, you remember the question or do 
you want me to rephrase it? 
A. No. Repeat it, please. 
Q. 'Okay. Do you believe that your current 
symptoms are related to the accident that was in 
May of 1998 and, if so, why? 
A. I believe that they are, yes. The 
reason I believe that is I've had no problems or 
any type like symptoms prior to the accident. 
All my problems have started to come on and 
caused and noticed since the accident. Prior to 
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that, I was functioning fine, doing my job, going 
on just like normal. Other than I'd watch my 
lower back, I knew I had a problem there, so I 
was cautious about that. But I didn't have any 
problems with neck, shoulder, upper back, my legs, 
the pain, none of that until the accident in 
1998 . 
Q. Okay. Let me ask it a little bit 
different way, okay? If you did not have the 
neck or the shoulder or the low back, you know, 
with the accompanying radiation of pain and so 
forth going down your hip, would you be able to 
act as an officer? 
THE WITNESS: Yes. 
MR. HOLM: Objection. Same objection, 
basically, but foundation for an opinion, a 
medical opinion. 
THE COURT: And I'm going to sustain 
that one. We do need some more foundation. 
MR. HOLM: And I guess this is also a 
vocational opinion that's being asked for now too. 
MR. PARKER: Okay. Let me--let me try 
it this way, okay? 
Q. Brent, you--you understood what is 
necessary to be an officer and you've gone through 
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the requirements and you've been a supervisor; is 
that correct? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Okay. If you did not have these neck 
and shoulder and low back problems, in your 
opinion, do you believe that you could still 
function as a--as an officer? 
A. Yes. 
MR. HOLM: Objection. Same objection. 
THE COURT: It's overruled. 
MR. PARKER: Okay. Thank you, Your 
Honor 
qui ck-
Your Honor, if I may just have one--one 
THE WITNESS: Do you want to hear my 
answer? Your Honor? 
THE COURT: Pardon? 
THE WITNESS: Did you hear my answer? 
THE COURT: Yes, I did. 
MR. PARKER: Oh. Maybe just for the 
record, since we were all talking over t h e — 
Q. You indicated that you could act as an 
officer if you did not have those — 
A. I said "Yes, I do." 
THE COURT: Yes, I understand that. 
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Did you f e e l t h a t k i n d of p a i n r e l a t e d t o y o u r 
l o w e r b a c k p a i n i n ' 9 0 - -
A. Y e s . 
Q. - - a n d ' 9 4 ? 
A. Yes. But in 1998, there was more on my 
body that was injured. In 1990 and '94, all I 
had was my lower back. It hurt immensely when I 
injured it. It got my attention. I went to the 
doctor. 
In 1998, I re-injured my lower back and 
my neck and my shoulder and my hip from falling 
down the stairs. And I had immense pain through 
that area. And it continually got worse. 
Q. So is it correct to say that it was a 
combination of all of the body parts that were in 
pain, that you felt such pain? 
A. 
correct. 
Q. 
Parker? 
Honor. 
Oh, I knew that I had--yes, that's 
Thank you. 
MS. LIMA: No further questions. 
THE COURT: Okay. Any redirect, Mr. 
MR. PARKER: I don't believe so, Your 
THE COURT: Any other questions? 
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Introduction 
This chapter provides information that will enable 
physicians to understand pain and develop a method 
to distinguish pain that accompanies illnesses and 
injuries from pain that has become an autonomous 
process, and provide physicians with a qualitative 
method for evaluating permanent impairment due to 
chronic pain. 
This chapter has been completely revised from the 
fourth edition. Its new features include (l) an 
overview of pain; (2) a discussion of the complexity 
of assessing impairment due to pain; (3) a review of 
situations in which pain is a major cause of suffering, 
dysfunction, or medical intervention rather than a 
part of injuries and illnesses of specific organ sys-
tems as covered in other chapters of the Guides; (4) a 
qualitative method for evaluating impairment due to 
chronic pain; and (5) a description of when to use the 
methods described in this chapter and how they can 
be integrated with the impairment rating methods 
used in other chapters of the Guides. 
Physicians need to use their clinical judgment as to 
what constitutes normal or expected pain in condi-
tions that produce widely variable amounts of pain; a 
herniated lumbar disk, for example, may be com-
pletely painless or incapacitatingly painful. This 
chapter focuses on those situations in which the pain 
itself is a major cause of suffering, dysfunction, or 
medical intervention. Pain as considered in this chap-
ter is persistent, which is not to say that it is refrac-
tory to all treatment, but that it is likely to be 
permanent and stationary. 
18.1 Principles of 
Assessment 
Before using the information in this chapter, the 
Guides user should become familiar with Chapters 1 
and 2 and the Glossary. Chapters 1 and 2 discuss the 
Guides' purpose, applications, and methods for per-
forming and reporting impairment evaluations. The 
Glossary provides definitions of common terms used 
by many specialties in impairment evaluation. 
It is considerably more difficult to provide a method 
for assessing chronic, persistent pain than acute 
pain. In chronic pain states, there is often no demon-
strable active disease or unhealed injury, and the 
autonomic changes that accompany acute pain, even 
in the anesthetized individual, are typically absent. 
Historically, it was assume I that pain derived from 
underlying peripheral tissue pathology and that its 
severity should correlate highly with the identified 
pathology. Current research, however, shows that 
pain perception is less a moment-to-moment analy-
sis of afferent input than a dynamic process influ-
enced by the effects of past experiences. Sensory 
stimuli act on neural systems that have been modi-
fied by earlier inputs, and the output of these sys-
tems is significantly influenced by the ''memory" 
of these prior events. 
18,2 Overview of Pain 
18.2a Definitions 
Pain is defined by the International Association for 
the Study of Pain' as "an unpleasant sensory and 
emotional experience associated with actual or 
potential tissue damage or described in terms of such 
damage." 
Pain is a plural concept with biological, psychologi-
cal, and social components. Its perception is influ-
enced by cognitive, behavioral, environmental, and 
cultural factors. At first glance, it seems at odds with 
scientific medicine because of the difficulty account-
ing for it with obvious pathophysiologic changes. 
Pain is subjective. Its presence cannot be readily val-
idated or objectively measured. Physicians are con-
fronted with ambiguity as they attempt to assess the 
severity and significance of chronic pain in their 
patients. In large part, this stems from the fundamen-
tal divide between a person who suffers from pain 
and an observer who attempts to understand that suf-
fering. Observers tend to view pain complaints with 
suspicion and disbelief, akin to complaints of dizzi-
ness, fatigue, and malaise. As Scarry remarked, "To 
have great pain is to have certainty, to hear that 
another person has pain is to have doubt."2 
The concept of chroni" pain as an extension of acute 
nociceptive pain is not valid. Chronic pain is an 
evolving process in which injury may produce one 
pathogenic mechanism, which in turn produces oth-
ers, so that the cause(s) of pain change over time. 
Support for this concept includes evidence that pri-
mary afferent discharge actually has the ability to 
injure or kill spinal inhibitory neurons (excitotoxic-
ity), leading to hyperexcitability due to disinhibition. 
Peripheral nerve injury can initiate evolving abnor-
malities in spinal cord neurons, which in turn gener-
ate abnormal responsiveness of thalamic neurons, 
which in turn generate cortical dysfunction. In time, 
these higher-level abnormalities may become inde-
pendent of the abnormalities that produced them.3 
Even in situations that might be expected to provide 
clear correlations between perceived pain and identi-
fied peripheral pathology, there are perplexing obser-
vations. For example, in up to 85% of individuals 
who report back pain, no pain-producing pathology 
can be identified4; conversely, some 30% of asympto-
matic people have significant pathology on magnetic 
resonance imaging (MRI)D and computed tomo-
graphic (CT) scans* that might be expected to cause 
pain. Headache is another common disabling condi-
tion in which impairment must be assessed primarily 
on the basis of individuals' reports of pain rather than 
on tissue pathology or anatomic abnormality. The 
reason is straightforward: in the majority of cases 
there is no demonstrable tissue pathology. Thus, pain 
can exist without tissue damage, and tissue damage 
can exist without pain. In summary, there is no "pain 
thermometer," that is, no biological measure that cor-
relates highly with individuals' complaints of pain. 
18.2b Impact of Pain on Population Health 
and Disability 
Pain is among the most common reasons for seeking 
medical attention accounting for more than 70 mil-
lion office \isits to ph> sicians each year It is also 
the most common cause of disability, with chronic 
low back pain alone accounting for more disability 
than any other condition resulting m nearly 150 mil-
lion lost work days in 1988 8 Disability related to 
back pain has increased dramatically, although there 
is no reason to suspect that back problems by them-
selves have increased910 Headache disorders are also 
a major cause of work loss " Despite advances in 
physiologic understanding, surgical interventions, 
and pharmacologic therapies, the prevalence of 
chronic pam shows no signs of abating and continues 
to be of epidemic proportions Notwithstanding this 
fact the importance of pam is often discounted 
Morris has averred that pam reported by somebody 
else falls into the category we reserve for whatever is 
invisible, subjective, immaterial and therefore 
unreal ' A 1987 report of the Social Secunty 
Administration opined that it is impossible to under-
stand the pain that another person is suffering u 
Pam is an essential determinant of the incapacitation 
of many individuals who undergo impairment evalu-
ation As observed by the Institute of Medicine 
Committee on Pam and Disability and Chronic 
Illness Behavior ,4 kThe notion that all impairments 
should be verifiable by objective evidence is admin-
istratively necessary for an entitlement program Yet 
this notion is fundament* ly at odds with a realistic 
understanding of how disease and injury operate to 
incapacitate people Except for a very few condi-
tions such as the loss of a limb, blindness deafness, 
paralysis, or coma, most diseases and injuries do not 
prevent people from working by mechanical failure 
Rather, people are incapacitated by a variety of 
unbearable sensations when they try to work ' 
When pain persists, it has the capacity to dominate a 
person's existence, contributing to significant impair-
ment reduction in the quality of life functional limi-
tations, and disability The ra\ages of chronic pam 
often extend beyond the person who has it, as the 
lives of family membeis are often dominated by the 
pain of a loved one Indeed the children of individu-
als with chrome pam are at risk for suffering a simi 
lar fate ' In addition to the human costs chronic pam 
is extremely costly to society Medical expenditures 
for pain-related assessment and treatment, indemnity 
costs loss of productivity and loss of tax revenues 
are estimated to be $125 billion each year in the 
United States 16 
18.2c Medical Advances in Understanding 
and Managing Pain 
Behavioral/Psychological 
Several major currents of thought and investigation 
in the last three decades have profoundly altered 
medical understanding of pam and its associated 
behaviors The first was the behavioral hypothesis 
that much of the behavior associated with chronic 
pain was not intrinsic to a disease or injury but, 
lather reflected emironmental contingencies l7This 
development led to the introduction of powerful clin-
ical interventions, but it had the unfortunate effect of 
increasing skepticism about the validity of the suffer-
ing in those with persistent pam 
The considerable role of cognitive factors and coping 
skills m augmenting and mitigating the suffering and 
dysfunction of chronic pam has been compelhngly 
demonstrated These insights have provided the 
foundation of efficacious treatments 18 
Associated with these developments has been the 
introduction of the term chionic pain s\ndrome (CPS) 
into common parlance Although not official nomen-
clature, it is frequently used to describe an individual 
who is markedly impaired by chronic pam with sub-
stantial psychological overlay l9 CPS is largely a 
behavioral syndrome that affects a minority of those 
with chronic pam It may best be understood as a form 
of abnormal illness behavior that consists mainly of 
excessive adoption of the sick role The term is useful 
in that it properly directs therapy toward the reversal 
of regression and away from an exclusive focus on 
elimination of nociception It does not, however, sub-
stitute for a careful diagnosis of the physiologic, psy-
chological and conditioning components that 
comprise the syndrome The term CPS must be used 
with caution, as groupmg pam problems together 
under a generic disoider may mask and leave 
untreated important physiologic differences 
Neurophysiologic 
A second major current has derived from explosive 
growth in our understanding of the pathophysiology of 
pam, winch has rendered many older concepts unten-
able Processes of peripheral and central sensitization 
have been clarified, along with such phenomena as the 
development of adienergic sensitivity in injured noci 
ceptive fibers and the accumulation of ion channels at 
sites of nerve injury, all of which may produce severe 
pam in response to trivial stimulation Processes have 
been identified by which umlateial inflammation, 
trauma, or illness can lead to pam and sensitivity in 
umnvolved, often contralateral, structures Physiologic 
processes underlying such symptoms, which were 
often dismissed as "not real," have been found at the 
level of the dorsal horn, thalamus, and sensory cortex. 
Intense stimulation and peripheral nerve damage have 
been found to induce persistent changes in the spinal 
cord that, over time, alter the receptive field mapping 
and the phenotype of neurons rostral to them, which in 
turn may induce changes at the cortical level. These 
findings are of major import. They demonstrate that 
pain need not be symptomatic of a disease or injury 
but, in fact, can become a disease unto itself. 
A major implication of recent research on sensitiza-
tion is that the failure of medical and surgical investi-
gation to account for a given pain may result not 
from looking in the wrong place, but from looking at 
the wrong time. That is, the investigations may be 
directed toward the organ or body part that was his-
torically responsible for the individual's pain, but 
they may be unrevealing because the pain, having 
been initiated by an injury or illness in the past, is 
now relatively independent. 
Although sensitization of the peripheral and central 
nervous system has been demonstrated repeatedly in 
basic neuroscience research, there are currently no 
widely accepted methods for determining whether 
the symptoms of an individual with chronic pain can 
be ascribed to sensitization. Thus, while the concept 
of sensitization is extremely important to a concep-
tual understanding of chronic pain, there is currently 
no systematic way to incorporate it into impairment 
ratings. 
The behavioral concept of CPS and the neurophysio-
logy concept of peripheral or central nervous system 
sensitization imply that pain and pain-related activity 
restrictions may be dissociated from the biological 
insult to which a person was exposed and from any 
measurable biological dysfunction in that person's 
organs or body parts. Both concepts thus challenge 
the assumed linkages among biological insult, organ 
or body part dysfunction, and ADL deficits that are 
fundamental to the AMA rating system. 
Physicians differ sharply in the way in which they 
conceptualize the relations among biological insult, 
measurable organ or body part dysfunction, and self-
reported activity limitations in individuals with 
chronic pain. Some physicians have a low threshold 
for using diagnoses like "chronic pain syndrome" or 
"psychogenic pain" to describe these people. The 
diagnoses highlight the lack of association between 
the complaints of the individuals and any well-
defined biological abnormality. 
Other physicians attempt to link the complaints of 
pain patients to a biological abnormality. In general, 
they do this by employing one of two strategies. The 
first is to view the person as having an atypical pres-
entation of a well-accepted syndrome. For example, 
thoracic outlet syndrome is a well-recognized condi-
tion that can be caused by measurable abnormalities 
in arterial, venous, or neural structures in the thoracic 
outlet. Some physicians view people with chronic 
pain and paresthesias in an upper extremity as having 
a variant of thoracic outlet syndrome, even though 
vascular studies and electrodiagnostic studies are 
either normal or equivocal.20 The other strategy is to 
construct diagnoses based on the person's symptoms 
and on subjective physical examination findings. The 
assumption of physicians employing this strategy is 
that a biological undeipinning for the symptoms 
exists, but that medical science has not yet identified 
it. For example, the diagnosis of fibromyalgia is 
based on individuals' reports of widespread pain and 
their reports of tenderness during physical examina-
tion. Despite extensive research, no specific underly-
ing biological abnormality has been discovered to 
explain the reports of these people. 
Implications 
The scientific advances described above have impor-
tant implications for the assessment of pain-related 
impairment. The AMA Guides as a whole embodies 
the premise that injuries and illnesses cause deficits 
in the functioning of organs or body parts, and these 
deficits can be quantitatively assessed during an 
impairment evaluation. In the simplest situations, an 
individual experiences a definite biological insult 
that creates a clear-cut abnormality in his or her bio-
logical functioning. This abnormality, in turn, leads 
directly to deficits in activities of daily living (ADL) 
that can be quantified during the course of an impair-
ment evaluation. An example is an individual who 
sustains a below-elbow amputation in a sawmill 
accident. 
Acrimonious debates have occurred between physi-
cians who favor biological explanations for contro-
versial pain syndromes and those who construe the 
syndromes as dissociated from any definable biologi-
cal abnormality. The interpretation has significant 
practical implications because many of the adminis-
trative agencies that provide benefits for people 
with impairments emphasize the importance of 
(1) objective findings of biological dysfunction and 
(2) a clear causal link between an index injury and 
an individual's present symptoms and findings. 
If a painful condition is construed as a CPS or a 
psychogenic pain syndrome, both of these criteria 
are violated. 
The distinction between well-accepted conditions 
and those that are ambiguous or controversial is 
itself ambiguous. Sometimes disagreements arise 
about individuals with atypical presentations of 
well-recognized painful syndromes. The example of 
thoracic outlet syndrome was given above. Another 
example is a person with chronic low back pain, 
vague symptoms in one lower extremity, and an MRI 
with questionable compromise of a lumbar nerve 
root. The person might be described as having an 
atypical presentation of a lumbar radiculopathy; an 
alternative assessment is that the individual has a 
nonspecific chronic pain syndrome involving the low 
back. In other instances, disagreements center 
around the validity of the diagnostic procedures used 
to diagnose conditions. For example, a practitioner 
of manual medicine might ascribe an individual's 
back pain to a lumbar sublux? ^ ion or torsion of the 
ilium, whereas physicians not practiced in manual 
medicine might discount these diagnoses because 
they do not accept the validity of the physical exami-
nation maneuvers underlying them. Finally, as in the 
case of fibromyalgia, reliable diagnostic criteria 
exist but physicians disagree about whether the 
condition diagnosed by use of these criteria has a 
specific, definable biologic basis. 
The controversies described above cannot be 
resolved in this chapter of the Guides for the simple 
reason that the medical community has not achieved 
consensus about how to construe such conditions as 
myofascial pain syndrome, fibromyalgia, and "dis-
puted neurogenic" thoracic outlet syndrome.20 A 
practical approach for performing impairment ratings 
on individuals with ambiguous or controversial syn-
dromes is given below. 
18.3 Integrating Pain-
Related 
Impairment Into 
the Conventional 
Impairment Rating 
System 
There are several difficulties associated with inte-
grating pain-related impairment into an impairment 
rating system such as the Guides. A basic challenge 
for a system of rating pain-related impairment is to 
incorporate the subjectivity associated with pain into 
an impairment rating system whose fundamental 
premise is that impairment assessment should be 
based on objective findings. The inherent subjectivity 
of pain is incongruent with the Guides' attempts to 
assess impairment on the basis of objective measures 
of organ dysfunction, as ;t requires that determina-
tions of pain intensity and the restrictions imposed 
by it must be largely based on patients' reports. 
A second issue is that an individual's pain behaviors 
are influenced by his or her social environment. 
Impairment ratings are usually performed not to 
establish academic facts or to make treatment deci-
sions but, rather, to establish the financial obligations 
of payers to individuals or, conversely, the entitle-
ments of individuals to monetary rewards. Thus, the 
social context surrounding impairment ratings might 
provide an incentive for individuals to exaggerate 
their reports of pain so as to maximize awards. 
Conversely, since insurance companies and govern-
ment agencies often hire the professionals who per-
form impairment ratings, evaluators may have an 
incentive to doubt the complaints of individuals. An 
ideal rating system would validate the genuine suf-
fering of individuals and resist influence by those 
who exaggerate their incapacitation for secondary 
gain. In the absence of objective criteria for assessing 
the severity and functional significance of pain, it has 
proved exceedingly difficult to achieve this goal. 
Third, this chapter assesses pain qualitatively. Because 
percentages for pain-related impairment have not been 
used and tested on a widespread basis, as have other 
impairment ratings used in the Guides, it was decided 
that impairment ratings for pain disorders would not 
be expressed as percentages of whole person impair-
ment. Future scientific evidence may emerge that will 
enable a more quantifiable approach to be adopted. 
Nevertheless, the value of a qualitative assessment is 
that any identification of a significant pain compo-
nent warrants additional consideration when inter-
preting impairment ratings used for allocation of 
medical resources, work placement, or financial 
compensation. 
Finally, at a practical level, a chapter of the Guides 
devoted to pain-related impairment should not be 
redundant of or inconsistent with principles of 
impairment rating described in other chapters. The 
Guides' impairment ratings currently include 
allowances for the pain that individuals typically 
experience when they suffer from various injuries or 
diseases, as articulated in Chapter 1 of the Guides: 
^Physicians recognize the local and distant pain that 
commonly accompanies many disorders. Impairment 
ratings in the Guides already have accounted for 
pain. For example, when a cervical spine disorder 
produces radiating pain down the arm, the arm pain, 
which is commonly seen, has been accounted for in 
the cervical spine impairment rating" (p. 10). Thus, 
if an examining physician determines that an individ-
ual has pain-related impairment, he or she will have 
the additional task of decic .ng whether or not that 
impairment has already been adequately incorpo-
rated into the rating the person has received on the 
basis of other chapters of the Guides. 
18.3a When This Chapter Should Be Used 
to Evaluate Pain-Related Impairment 
Organ and body system ratings of impairment should 
be used whenever they adequately capture the actual 
ADL deficits that individuals experience. However, 
the organ and body system impairment rating does 
not adequately address impairment in several situa-
tions, discussed below. 
When There Is Excess Pain in the Context of 
Verifiable Medical Conditions That Cause Pain 
Individuals in this group have pain associated with 
medical conditions that are verifiable by objective 
means. An example is an individual with a persistent 
lumbar radiculopathy following a lumbar diskec-
tomy. Such an individual will usually have objective 
findings, including atrophy of the affected leg, mus-
cle weakness, and MRI evidence of epidural scar-
ring. An individual with these findings would receive 
an impairment rating of 10% on the basis of the DRE 
spine impairment rating system described in Chapter 
15. Although the DRE rating is usually appropriate, 
some individuals with persistent lumbar radicu-
lopathies report "excess'' pain. That is, they report 
that their pain causes severe ADL deficits, suggest-
ing a level of impairment greater than 10%. 
Procedures in this chapter can be used to assess this 
additional impairment and to classify it as mild, 
moderate, moderately severe, or severe. 
When There Are Well-Established Pain 
Syndromes Without Significant, Identifiable 
Organ Dysfunction to Explain the Pain 
Individuals in this group have pain syndromes that 
are widely accepted by physicians based on the 
individuals' clinical presentation but that are not asso-
ciated with definable tissue pathology. These syn-
dromes are not ratable under the conventional rating 
system and also they do not fit any of the other chap-
ters in the Guides since there is no measurable organ 
dysfunction. Individuals with these well-established 
pain syndromes can be evaluated on the basis of con-
cepts elaborated in this chapter. These individuals 
must have symptoms and signs that can plausibly be 
attributed to a well-defined medical condition. Some 
of the most common of these syndromes are listed in 
Table 18-1. The list is not comprehensive and may 
change as the body of medical information about 
various pain syndromes grows. If an examiner deter-
mines that an individual has a diagnosis that is not 
on the list, he or she may rate the individual's pain-
related impairment if he or she is convinced that the 
diagnosed condition is well recognized and that the 
pain-related impairment is a consequence of the con-
dition. An explanation should be provided in writing. 
Table 18-1 Illustrative List of Weil-Established Pain 
Syndromes Without Significant, Identifiable 
Organ Dysfunction to Explain the Pain 
Headache (most) 
Postherpetic neuralgia 
Tic douloureux 
Erythromelalgia 
Complex regional pain syndrome, type 1 (reflex 
sympathetic dystrophy) 
I Any injury to the nervous system 
When There Are Other Associated Pain 
Syndromes 
Use this chapter to evaluate pain-related impairment 
when dealing with syndromes with the following 
characteristics: (a) They are associated with identifi-
able organ dysfunction that is ratable according to 
other chapters in the Guides; (b) they may be associ-
ated with well-established pain syndromes, but the 
occurrence or nonoccurrence of the pain syndromes 
is not predictable; so that (c) the impairment ratings 
provided in other chapters of the Guides do not cap-
ture the added burden of illness borne by individuals 
who have the associated pain syndromes. 
Examples of syndromes in this category are given in 
Table 18-2. Again, the list is not comprehensive, so 
an examiner must use his or her judgment to decide 
whether an individual with a > unlisted condition 
should be placed in this category. 
18.3b When This Chapter Should Not Be 
Used to Rate Pain-Related Impairment 
When Conditions Are Adequately Rated in 
Other Chapters of the Guides 
Examiners should not use this chapter to rate pain-
related impairment for any condition that can be ade-
quately rated on the basis of the body and organ 
impairment rating systems given in other chapters of 
the Guides. 
Table 18-2 Illustrative List of Associated Pain 
Syndromes 
Postparaplegic pain 
Syringomyelia pain 
Thalamic syndrome 
Brachial plexus avulsion pain 
Nerve entrapment syndromes 
Peripheral neuropathy 
I Complex regional pain syndrome, type 2 (causalgia) 
When Rating Individuals With Low 
Credibility 
Since the assessment of pain-related impairment 
depends heavily on the verbal reports of individuals, 
examiners must be careful to provide ratings only for 
those who provide information that appears to be 
reasonable and accurate. The reports of individuals 
may lack credibility for a variety of reasons. Some 
people appear unable or unwilling to provide infor-
mation that is sufficiently detailed for an examiner to 
assess pain-related impairment. The reasons for this 
are multiple, including psychosis, severe depression, 
memory deficits secondary to brain injury, and a lack 
of cooperation. Other individuals provide detailed 
information, but the validity of the information is 
questionable. 
When There Are Ambiguous or 
Controversial Pain Syndromes 
As noted above, physicians disagree sharply about 
whether individuals with chronic pain should be con-
strued as having conditions with definite, albeit 
obscure, biologic underpinnings. The alternative is to 
describe these people as having CPS, psychogenic 
pain syndromes, or some other term implying that 
their pain cannot be associated with a well-accepted 
biologic abnormality. For purposes of this chapter, 
the pain of individuals with ambiguous or controver-
sial pain syndromes is considered unratable. 
As noted earlier, the distinctions between well-
recognized conditions and ambiguous or controver-
sial ones is subtle, so that no definitive list of 
ambiguous or controversial conditions can be given. 
The examining physician can. however, identify 
ambiguous or controversial syndromes by asking 
the following questions: 
1. Do the individual's symptoms and/or physical 
findings match any known medical condition? 
2. Is the individual's presentation typical of the diag-
nosed condition? 
3. Is the diagnosed condition one that is widely 
accepted by physicians as having a well-defined 
pathophysiologic basis? 
If the answer to all three of the above questions is 
yes, the examiner should consider the individual's 
pain-related impairment to be ratable and should pro-
ceed according to the rating protocol described in 
Section 18.3d. If the answer to any of the above three 
questions is no, the examiner should consider the 
individual's pam-related impairment to be unratable 
on the basis of concepts in this chapter. In that 
instance, he or she should still use the assessment 
protocol described in Section 18.3d to determine the 
severity and impact of the individual's pain and 
report the results. That is, even if the examiner con-
siders the person to have unratable pain, he or she 
needs to characterize the apparent pain-related 
impairment. 
Advances in diagnostic technology and clinical expe-
rience may eventually make pain-related impairment 
rating feasible for individuals with ambiguous or 
controversial pain syndromes. Al the present time, 
however, the best option available to an examiner is 
to report that the individual has apparent impairment 
that is unratable on the basis of current medical 
knowledge. Insurance companies and administrative 
agencies that dispense benefits for impairments will 
need to make the final decision about how to use this 
information. 
18.3c Administrative Issues Associated 
With Pain-Related Impairment 
In essence, this chapter divides apparent impairment 
into three categories: (1) impairment ratable on the 
basis of the conventional rating system used through-
out Guides Chapters 3 through 17; (2) pain-related 
impairment ratable according to concepts outlined in 
this chapter; and (3) p;, n-related impairment that is 
unratable according to the concepts outlined in this 
chapter. 
There are two major reasons why these distinctions 
are crucial. First, agencies that provide benefits for 
individuals with impairments function under differ-
ent legal mandates with respect to pain-related 
impairment. For example, workers' compensation 
laws in some states mandate that pain-related impair-
ment be considered in disability awards for injured 
workers.21 In other states pain-related impairment is 
not considered.22 
The system described here distinguishes between an 
impairment rating using the organ system approach 
and impairment awarded on the basis of pain. This 
distinction permits administrative agencies to count 
''conventional" impairment ratings and pain-related 
impairment ratings on an equal footing, to discount 
pain-related impairment ratings, or to disregard them 
entirely. Similarly, the present system identifies indi-
viduals with unratable pain-related impairment so 
that administrative agencies can make informed deci-
sions about whether or not to compensate these 
individuals. 
The fact that pain-related impairment may be unrat-
able either on the basis of the organ and body rating 
system or on the basis of this chapter highlights the 
limits that exist in the science and practice of impair-
ment evaluation. The judgment that pain-related 
impairment is unratable does not mean that the evalu-
ating physician considers the pain to be "unreal" or 
fabricated. In fact, individuals with ambiguous or 
controversial pain syndromes may suffer from severe 
pain and report significant restrictions in ADL. These 
reports are often corroborated by information pro-
vided by family members and treating physicians. 
Thus, when a physician judges pain-related impair-
ment to be unratable, he or she is simply asserting an 
inability to determine how the activity restrictions 
reported by an individual are linked to a disease or 
injury. The decision regarding how to construe these 
reports must therefore be administrative, not medical. 
Second, the distinction between ratable and unratable 
pain-related impairment embodies a key premise of 
this chapter physicians do not currently possess reli-
able valid techniques for assessing impairment asso-
ciated with pain in all clinical settings It is then 
more appropriate for the examining physician to 
descnbe the individual's pain-related impairment as 
unratable than to give a rating that cannot be sup-
ported by either scientific evidence or consensus 
18.3d How to Rate Pain-Related 
Impairment: Overview 
The system described in this chapter relies largely on 
self-reports by individuals Thus, it differs signifi-
cantly from the conventional rating system, which 
relies primarily on objective indices of organ dys-
function or failure The present system assesses pain 
intensity, emotional distress related to pain and ADL 
deficits secondary to pain ADL deficits are given the 
greatest weight An individual's pain-related impair-
ment is considered unratable if (a) his or her behav-
ior during the evaluation raises significant issues of 
credibility, (b) he or she has clinical findings atypical 
of a well-accepted medical condition, or (c) he or 
she is diagnosed with a condition that is vague or 
controversial 
A detailed protocol for assessing pain-related impair-
ment is descnbed below and outlined in Figure 18-1 
A Evaluate the individual according to the body or 
organ rating system an 1 determine an impairment 
percentage During the evaluation, the examiner 
should informally assess pain-related impairment 
B If the body system impairment rating appears to 
adequately encompass the pain experienced by 
the individual due to his or her medical condition, 
his or her impairment rating is as indicated by the 
body system impairment rating 
C It the individual appears to have pain-related 
impairment that has increased the burden of his or 
her condition slightly, the examiner may increase 
the percentage found in A by up to 3% 
D The examiner should perform a formal pain-
related impairment assessment if any of the fol-
lowing conditions are met 
1) The individual appears to have pain-related 
impairment that is substantially in excess of 
the impairment determined in step A 
01 
2) The individual has a well-recognized medical 
condition that is characterized by pam in the 
absence of measurable dysfunction of an organ 
or body part (see Table 18-1 for examples) 
or 
3) The individual has a syndrome with the follow-
ing characteristics (a) it is associated with 
identifiable organ dysfunction that is ratable 
according to other chapters in the Guides, (b) it 
may be associated with a well-established pam 
syndrome, but L,e occurrence or nonoccur-
rence of the pam syndrome is not predictable, 
so that (c) the impairment ratings provided in 
step A do not capture the added burden of ill-
ness borne by the individual because of his or 
her associated pain syndrome (see Table 18-2 
for examples) 
E If the examiner performs a formal pain-related 
impairment rating, he or she may increase the per-
centage found m step A by up to 3%, and he or 
she should classify the individual's pain-related 
impairment into one of foui categories mild, 
moderate, moderately severe, or severe In addi-
tion, the examiner should determine whether the 
pain-related impairment is latable or wvatable 
